

THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

“KINGS shall be thy nursing-fathers.” Seventeenth-century churchmanship found here a Biblical warrant for its Church and King ideal, as may be seen from the Dedication of the Authorised Version of the Bible. It was a pleasant ideal. Under King Charles I. it bore some noble fruit. So it did also in the next reign, but somehow the bitterness of civil war had by that time gnawed at the vitals of both sides. If the conditions of the reign of the first Charles had been easier, and if the King to his many virtues had added a few more, a large-scale harvest might have been reaped from the ideal. The situation hopefully envisaged in 1661 by the pious memories of the restored divines, and assumed in the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer—a situation which was by that time about thirty years out of date—might never have needed to be recovered. As it was, the situation was recovered only on paper. It was too late for a really national churchmanship. The Puritans were hostile. The churchmen, especially in the House of Commons, were overbearing.

The text itself, like so many Bible texts, was misunderstood and misapplied. A nursing-father is a servant who carries and attends upon his master’s child. Isaiah xlix. 23 seems to refer to foreign kings who shall be the humble servants of the chosen people. “They shall bow down to thee with their faces to the earth and lick the dust of thy feet.” In Numbers xi. 12 Moses indignantly disclaims the rôle of a mere nursing-father to a greedy and rebellious people. Yet such is the magic of the Bible that even to misunderstand it is better than to understand most things. *Errare malo*, said Cicero, *cum Platone quam cum istis vera sentire*. Our claim for the Bible is less sentimental and more practical. We admit that it would be possible to err with the Bible here and there by taking bits of it out of their context, that is, out of their divinely-ordered evolutionary setting. This

we have no desire to do. Our point is that the Bible is generally so right that even a mistranslation of it may lead to better results than a correct rendering of the wisdom of Confucius or of some other sage. Our monarchs, our Royal Family, at least during recent generations, have fulfilled the vocation implied by the Caroline misunderstanding by setting themselves to perform the duties of a nursing-father as they are in fact. They have become the servants of their people. And thus they have made good.

There are various definitions of a gentleman. The Fifteenth Psalm is one. Newman suggested that a gentleman is "one who never inflicts pain . . . has no ear for slander and gossip, . . . interprets everything for the best . . . he may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust." And St. Luke in his version of the Parable of the Sower borrows a familiar Greek term *Kalos k'agathos* to express the "honest and good heart" with which some, "having heard the word, hold it fast, and bring forth fruit with patience." Judged even by these exacting standards, His Majesty King George V. will stand the test. It is said that Mandell Creighton, Oxonian, domiciled at Cambridge, was asked after some years of sojourning in the alien atmosphere, how he liked it. "Very much," he said. And when the flattered and perhaps slightly surprised Cambridge hearers asked him why, he continued, "Because, the older I get, the more I appreciate the value of simple goodness, just simple goodness." It is possible that the Professors and Fellows of Colleges who heard this were not altogether gratified. And indeed there are for them some humdrum duties of research and lecturing for which the qualifications are as a rule otherwise expressed. But simple goodness on a throne is no bad thing. It means the positive, single-minded simplicity which is not misled by ambition, which is not distracted by opportunism, which does not deceive itself by hypocrisy. It means the goodness which steadily pursues right ends. It means the kind of character which, seated on a throne, makes for the edification of the people and the stability of the throne itself. Kingship must be a difficult vocation. To be at the top, and therefore to be hatefully conspicuous. To be at the top, and therefore to have to give more attention to balance than those who are on the ground below. To be at the top, and therefore to have a restricted scope for movement. To be at the top, and therefore to be lonely.

We all know something of what we have gained in five and twenty years from the pattern of the moral soundness, the unflagging industry, the high-minded sagacity of King George. We do not know what it has cost His Majesty. We may hazard the suggestion that the cost was gladly paid. So far as we can see, the King has said to his people in the words of Ruth to Naomi, "Whither thou goest I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God; where thou diest, I will die, and there will I be buried; the Lord do so to me and more also, if aught but death part thee and me." The result of this is at our end a loyalty that is full of warm affection. There are some forms of words which are used constantly, always with respect, but not always with a deep sense of what they mean. At this season they easily bear for us their full and proper meaning. The secular form is "Gentlemen, the King!" The more solemn form is "God save the King!"

The weeks after Easter are a period in which we lay hold of the Resurrection as a thing which is permanent and universally available. Low Sunday is a test-case. It represents the beginning of institutionalism. On the first day of the week the disciples are again assembled, perhaps in the same Upper Room. The Christian Year with its memorials and anniversaries has been inaugurated. Can it be kept fresh and spiritual? Will they succumb to the perils that lie in wait for those who do things every year, or every month, or every day? Well, it depends what the thing is, and what sort of heart you bring to it. Easter itself is so rich in life, and the action of the better part of man is happily both so much more spontaneous and so much more enduring than that of the lower part, that it ought not to be, as indeed it is not, impossible. We are apt to "shut the doors" much more than is necessary. And that which is represented by the "fear of the Jews" in the Low Sunday Gospel is still detrimental. But in spite of our agoraphobia and whatever other phobias we have, it is still true that on last Sunday morning "came Jesus and stood in the midst."

Dr. Emery Barnes, who writes an article in this number on the Old Testament in the Christian Church, is among other things an apostle of reformed spelling. The normal editor, faced by the resultant phenomena, would have two alternatives. He could conventionalize the spelling, or print it as it stands. For an editor brought up at the feet of Dr. Barnes there is no choice. Instinct and prejudice revolt, but piety prevails. The article,

whose *mitis sapientia* will commend its contents to readers, is here printed as the author wrote it. There is a reformed spelling story in a little book by the late Poet Laureate, which is not so well known as it should be. His point was that we need in English an indistinct vowel, like the Hebrew *sheva*, to express, e.g., the sound of "to" with an infinitive. Many English people overstress this sound. There was once a man in a hospital. He was not highly educated, and when he saw on the chart over his head the direction that his medicine was to be taken *ter die*, he thought that it meant that he was *moriturus*. He leaped out of his bed and incontinently bolted.

Another light touch is provided this month by a contributor. A friend of the Editor, whose writings have been and will be again a valuable element in THEOLOGY, submitted a University Sermon for publication. After the usual interval, spent by the Editor in reading and re-reading this and in much heart-searching, the MS. was sent back and it was intimated that space was not available. The writer replied, "So you really thought that my poor little sermon was not so good as some of the rum stuff that you print in THEOLOGY." This cruel insinuation could not be allowed to go unchallenged. The rejoinder was that the sermon was excellent, but that an editor had to provide variety. He then received the following *jeu d'esprit*:

Said a humorous Dean of the West,
"If your merit be truly assessed,
Your sermon's as fine as
Saint Thomas Aquinas;
But sameness is what I detest."

Those who are wanting a small book which will give all the information required by serious but not at present very advanced students of the Gospels, will find what they want in a volume to which the Bishop of Bradford contributes a Preface, *The Growth and Structure of the Gospels*, by B. K. Rattey, S.Th. (Oxford University Press, 3s.). It contains an astonishing amount of information, based on much patient study of the originals and of the best modern authorities thereon, and expressed with a lucidity which shews the hand of the practised teacher. Its method is analytic, but its purpose and its effect constructive, and it is the kind of book which would help to make the lessons of teachers in schools and Training Colleges both valuable and interesting.

Our first article this month on Guignebert and Loisy is timely in view of what was said in the April number of the *Hibbert Journal* "In Defence of Loisy." If M. Loisy is misinterpreted or misjudged, by all means let us speak and write in his defence; but it is surprising to find it suggested by the writer of the Hibbert article that in him there may be seen "a figure who has taken a great step in causing the Christian religion to clothe itself in a new theological form; a form which shall give it the freedom to expand itself and to adapt itself to meet the needs of a modern world which longs to find the way of salvation." The ground of this hope is a conviction that "the external conditions and facts connected with the life and death and resurrection of Jesus matter little in comparison with the living faith which He inspires." But this sort of theosophy is not new. St. Irenæus, disciple of St. Polycarp, was familiar with it. In his day it was called Gnosticism. It offered to Christianity a glittering bribe, if only it would cut loose from some of its entangling, low-brow alliances. It is at all times a great prospect, the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them—we use the words with all respect, in their best sense—a great, attractive, noble prospect. But, like St. Irenæus, we know that in order to inherit anything, it is necessary to be alive. It would be fatal *propter vivendi causas perdere vitam*. Or, to choose a rather less grim metaphor, it is simple to claim everything and everybody as on your side, if you have no side. M. Loisy is said "indirectly to have saved the fabric of historical Christianity, if by that term we mean a Christianity which is alive and in harmony with the spiritual life and thought of the human race." But do we, can we, mean no more than that?

The pamphlet *Catholic Reunion* (Blackwell), by "Clement Humilis," who now proves to be the Rev. J. T. Plowden-Wardlaw, demands some editorial comment. It is well written, and the author, who has been a barrister, and has also been, as it seems, a Roman Catholic, has many shrewd and interesting things to say. But he lives in a world of his own. His first paragraph, while it guards him from any possible imputation of courtesy, shews that he has no belief whatever in the Church of England as it now is. His second affirms his belief that there always has been and must be a centre of unity. The "claims" of Rome are essential in the interests of unity. The test of Catholicity is being in communion with the Vicar of Christ. At this point we recall the words of Dr. Swete, who, commenting on the seemingly curious fact that the word *catholicam* was not found in early forms of the old Roman Creed, said that "it

may be suspected that Rome was never in hearty sympathy with the idea of the Church's catholicity; when she borrowed the word, it was narrowed in her use into a sense alien to that which it had borne on the lips of the first teachers of the Faith" (*The Apostles' Creed*, p. 74).

It seems to our author that the present Pope, a man of consummate ability, whose official residence is replete with the most up-to-date business appliances, has now a unique opportunity. By an ecclesiastical "Statute of Westminster" he might give Dominion, that is uniate, status to the Anglican Communion. He would thus secure to Catholicity, interpreted in the liberal, non-Latinizing sense which is admitted in the East, though not hitherto in the West, the Church of England. But would the Church of England accept the invitation? It is suggested that all would, except "three-quarters of the modern Church of England." It is thought that there might be a few more from the Free Churches. On the other hand, the faithful 25 per cent., who are as Catholic as is possible in the circumstances, are defined as those who practise Confession and prayers to Our Lady, and it is added that "it is needless perhaps to persuade such people to believe in Our Lady's Immaculate Conception or in her Assumption, because they have already received these doctrines—the one as defined by the Supreme Pontiff, and the other (although corporal assumption is not yet an article of faith) as part of the customary doctrine of East and West—and have welcomed these doctrines as part of the great deposit, defined or customary, of which the Catholic Church is guardian." If that is so, we cannot help thinking that the estimate of 25 per cent. is unduly optimistic.

And yet this quarter, or less, is all we have to bargain with. "Anglo-Catholics are not a party at all, but the Church of England itself." Yet even these are not without reproach. "Rome has always held herself out as the guardian of the original deposit" (even, we presume, in 1854 and 1870), and "no modification on her part can be thought of as a preliminary for intercommunion. Rome will never level down; Canterbury must level up." Of theology as enquiry Mr. Plowden-Wardlaw has no notion. It is all authoritative dogma. He passes no express judgment on the validity of English Orders, but anyhow "Anglican orders are being quietly mended as regards Roman acknowledgement," and by a method which, when it is suggested for Finland, is condemned as "mechanical." On the other

hand, Mr. Plowden-Wardlaw will not hear of any Latinization of the English Church. There must be no absorption, "our loyalty to the Pope is to his status as Supreme Pontiff rather than as Western Patriarch," there must be a Liturgy in English, and (for the remainder of this generation) married priests, and the English Roman Catholics and the Catholicized (but not Latinized) Anglo-Catholics will go on side by side. It is a fine vision. But to a fatal extent it lacks contact with reality. A traveller in Ireland once asked the way to Carrickfergus. "Faith, if I were going to Carrickfergus, I would not start from here." We of the Church of England have had a certain experience of God and life. It had brought us to a point which may be called "Here." We do not reply to all questions, *J'y suis, j'y reste.* But "Here" has to be reckoned with more than Mr. Plowden-Wardlaw supposes.

GUIGNEBERT AND LOISY

THE recent appearance of two French works of first-class importance claiming to give an objective account of the origin of Christianity deserves our careful attention. They are Ch. Guignebert's *Jésus* in the series *L'évolution de l'humanité** and M. Loisy's *La Naissance du Christianisme*. Loisy's position is so well known in England as to justify our giving more space to the former book.

The editor of the series, M. Berr, in his preface notes the complete objectivity of the historian as between fideist preconceptions on the one side and rationalistic prejudices on the other. We shall return to this claim presently.

I

Guignebert begins with an instructive comparison between the state of criticism at the end of the nineteenth century and that which prevails today. In the year 1900 scholars were still influenced by traditionalist views. They started from Israel as depicted in the Bible—a closed world. Within that world appeared Jesus, to whose initiative Christianity was due. The Church in the preaching of the Apostles was a Jewish enterprise transferred to the Greek-Roman world, to the needs of which it was adapted by St. Paul. We now see that Christianity did not break through the religious front of antiquity, rather it was a section of that front. First century Judaism is shewn to have been syncretistic, especially in the Dispersion. The Hellenistic *milieu* has been studied with care. The importance of persons has diminished, that of *milieux* and "collectivities" has increased. Christianity has been "socialized." In particular, Paul has yielded to Paulinism, and the Gospel evidence carefully examined has lessened the influence of Christ.

With much of this diagnosis we can agree, reserving for the present the question of personalities over against communities. In contrast with Loisy, Guignebert rejects the view that Christianity was a product of the social ferment of the proletariat. We are explaining something we know by what is unknown; there is no evidence that such ferment ever existed. Jewish apocalyptic had no concern with economics; if the Gospel arose from a social-revolutionary impetus, how did it come to produce a religion of resignation? The originality of Jesus, such as it was, consisted in His simpler and more benevolent version of

* Published by "La Renaissance du livre" (Paris, 1933). An English translation is announced.

Pharisaic piety. There is no evidence that He thought of Himself as Messiah, or that He was connected with any sect or group.

Passing over the detailed treatment, often very sceptical, of the Ministry, we come to the Easter faith. The disciples, we are told, lost courage, not faith. They were Jews, accustomed to draw comfort from disillusion. They had no prevenient incredulity, such as possesses modern men; they believed in *revenants* and had no conception of the mechanism of hallucination. The original vision was probably seen by Peter on the shores of the Lake, in the old surroundings. It was an illusion, but repeated, and in different circumstances. Such collective hallucinations present no difficulty; we may compare the visions of the Virgin Mary today—one sees her and all say that they see. Enthusiasm begat Christianity, but it was the enthusiasm of the disciples, not that of Jesus. This enthusiasm based on hallucinations went out into the world and coalesced with the mysteries of immortality, and of saviour-gods dying and rising again.

M. Loisy's views on the Gospels need not be re-examined; it is sufficient for our purpose to record his explanation of the Easter faith. After the Crucifixion, we read, "the shock was violent; but their faith had been profound already and it necessarily reacted against the violence of the shock. This reaction was the easier in that they had known the horrors of the Crucifixion and the infamy of the burial only by hearsay. . . . The inner work of faith resuscitated Jesus for those who had believed in Him before." They believed in a Jesus in glory, as they believed in the saints described by Daniel; no proofs were necessary. "Faith makes for itself unconsciously all the illusions necessary for its preservation and progress. . . . One fine day he (Peter) thought that he saw his Master and perhaps that he heard Him. His faith put into the vision all that he desired to believe and gave him the assurance that the vision was a reality" (pp. 119-130). Loisy concludes: "This triumph of faith (the spread of the Church) . . . was a human marvel, a life-creation, a work of human progress. Its success had been prepared by the diffusion of Judaism. But Christianity realized a victory which Judaism indeed began but proved impotent to follow up, because it held the idea of universal humanity captive in the forms of a narrow nationalism. This idea Christianity offered, under the form of a religious symbol, to all the disinherited of the ancient world, who had no country, and they joined it" (p. 442).

The disinherited! Loisy interprets the New Testament in the light of the French and Russian revolutions. Who, coming from St. Paul's and St. Peter's Epistles, would recognize the description? So far from having no country, St. Paul boasted

of his Roman citizenship. Apart from the Apocalypse, the impression derived from the documents is one of "little men" indeed, the *petite bourgeoisie*, but men who remained loyal under great provocation. When the curtain rises on post-canonical literature in 1 Clement we find that the Neronian persecution has apparently left no resentment, but the young Church of Rome, of Hellenistic origin, has already appropriated the characteristic virtues of the old city and is enthusiastically loyal.

II

Before we criticize this French "historical" school, something must be said about the nature of history.*

It is an art, requiring imagination and sympathy for its exercise, not a science of cause and effect in human affairs, able to predict coming events. Not every thing that happens is history—a papyrus discovered in Egypt recording a routine business transaction is not history—rather it is "the outcome of those creative acts of individuals which make values available for mankind," a record of things which happen as a result of which human society will never be the same again. History is always being re-written, because our judgment of it varies with each generation *in the light of consequences*.

Can there then be any assured verdict of history, except as regards names and dates? So much of the past has gone beyond our ken. What remains is difficult because we do not know the motives of the actors; we miss the *imponderabilia*, the multitude of things necessary for our picture which were so much a matter of course that they were never recorded at all; and, above all, our own point of view is continually shifting. The telescope by which we view the past may be improved continually, but the observer's eye is changing all the time. Since history is inevitably a matter of selection, the choice of material is dictated by our contemporary interests. But more than that, a slight change in the material selected often makes the whole picture different, as the facts rearrange themselves in kaleidoscopic fashion.

For example, what scorn used to be poured on the "Kings of England" type of history! The only thing that mattered was the life of the labourer on the manor or the food eaten by the city apprentice. But the Kings have come back again. It is realized that the labourer left to himself would never have changed, or at least so slowly as not to affect the argument. The Kings did the things which altered the course of human society.

* The following paragraph is based on H. G. Wood's *Christianity and the Nature of History*.

One cannot read our two French authors without asking what is their point of view. Guignebert's tell-tale phrase, that Christianity has been socialized (*se socialise*), betrays him. He is at the extreme end of the pendulum swing away from Carlyle's theory of great men. Reflecting the social democratic tendencies in which he has been brought up, he believes that society makes leaders, who are thrown up as required. With this philosophy of history, no wonder he belittles Christ and says in effect that the Church made Christ. And already his philosophy is old-fashioned, as one after another leaders and dictators arise who impress their wills on nations.

One thing emerges clearly from the two books. It is apparently an assured result of strictly historical research that the disciples were greater than Jesus, the last thing that could be deduced from the documents studied. This is surely a danger sign, suggesting that something is wrong with the method.

III

The parallel with science is instructive. Sometimes we hear it objected that the overwhelming mass of scientists, contrasted with the few whom theologians eagerly read and quote, make no concessions to religion. This is perfectly true; they are absorbed in their own specialized studies and are not called upon to do more than describe the course and result of their investigations. But scientific philosophers, those who try to understand the ultimate meaning and the values of their researches, have in recent years for the most part given a religious interpretation of phenomena. They have recognized the limitations of the scientific method and reached out to a realm of values which overlaps with religion. So marked is the tendency that the real issue in Western countries today is not so much between atheism and religion as between differing conceptions of the meaning of the term "God." If this is not yet clear the reason is that popular thought is still dominated by the materialism that is passing away.

Now if science and religion cannot be kept apart but must strive to come to terms, what shall we make of scientific history which rules out religion from the outset? If history is an art, if the past cannot be interpreted without sympathy and insight, the writer on the history of Christianity who rules out the possibility of divine action, other than that implied by the view that all history may be indifferently described as manifesting "God," is sure to go wrong. The scientist can at least describe accurately, though he may fail to interpret. The historian cannot even describe truly, if he has come to an *a priori* decision that the motive-power of the personalities studied, which they

and their successors in the same tradition believed to exist, was a mere illusion.

Jesus, so we learn from the Gospels, lived *in* something we cannot measure, the sense of a near and living God. The Epistles teach us that the Church was founded on belief in the Risen Christ; the Christians held that they were "in Christ," and thereby in God. The motives which ultimately conquered Greek-Roman society were other-worldly, anchored in God. Naturally the treasure was carried in earthen vessels, and the outward forms of early Christianity were those of the group-life of its time. But what kind of truth is likely to emerge from historical discussion if inquirers *ab initio* rule out the possibility of there being any hid treasure? About as much as would be found in a monograph upon Bach's music by a writer who was incompetent to understand his meaning. The wise historian of Christianity would at least plan his book on the assumption that he was treating something significant and true, whatever his mental reservations might be. But just at this point we are confronted with the unbridged gulf. He cannot, with the best will in the world, win the necessary sympathy with the actors in the drama unless he shares their outlook. The ideal history of the origin of Christianity would seem impossible until a writer is raised up who has at once an enthusiastic and unfeigned sympathy with the Apostles' faith and a rigidly scientific method. And who is sufficient for these things?

It may be supposed that such a writer would go a long way with Guignebert, Loisy, and others of the sceptical school. He would draw out to the full the implications of the statement that Christ came "in the fullness of the time." He would not be afraid to trace, perhaps from Iranian origins, the conception of the Heavenly Man. The yearnings enshrined in the mysteries, the belief in saviour-gods dying and rising again, the emergence of the individual with a desire for personal immortality—all this and much else would be vividly present to his mind. Christianity, so to speak, was in the air in the first century of our era. But a spark was needed to kindle the combustible matter, so that in the fusion a new compound might arise. Who was the Prometheus that brought the fire from heaven? Our historian would not descend to the pitiful bathos of saying that "one fine day" Peter had an illusion. Jesus Himself would be the only possible cause. We are not asking that the historian should turn theologian and undertake the interpretation which belongs to the latter, only that he should not make his task impossible by ruling out the essential elements of his material.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*

I AM askt to giv some answer to the Question, "Is the O.T. of value to Christians?" Indeed I am prepared to giv more than a simple "yes" for the answer, because I beleev the O.T. to hav been from the first AND STIL TO BE of very grate religious value to us all. And the best way of defending my beleef is to let the O.T. speak for itself. So I propose to read to you a few out of many passages which illustrate its manifold excellence. And if some of you miss your own favourite chapters, let me explain that I hav deliberately chosen among my examples some less known passages in the hope that you wil turn to them again, and add them to your reading. I shal use the R.V. usually, becaus it is so much better than the A.V., but occassionally for grater clearness I shal paraphrase the Hebrew text.

It is true that the Old Testament contains many chapters which we do not wish to read in church, and even of those passages which are read there are a number which are not edifying for the ordinary Christian. But on the other hand there are messages in the Old Testament which are valid for all time; which touch the fundamentals of true religion. And we must remember that many of the stumbling-blocks for Christians which occur in the O.T. are due to the mistranslations of the versions we commonly use. This is particularly the case with the Prayer Book Version of the Psalms. Take an example or two. In lxii. 3, we sing, "How long will ye imagine mischief against every man? Ye shall be slain, all the sort of you." "Fierce and resentful," you say. Yes, but listen to the true rendering from the R.V., "How long will ye set upon a man, That ye may slay him, all of you?" The fierceness is on the other side, with the Psalmist's enemies. Or again, why shou'd Christians sing, "Bring unto the Lord, O ye mighty, bring young rams unto the Lord," when there are NO YOUNG RAMS in the Hebrew original, and modern Christians hav no intention of bringing any? (Ps. xxix. 1.)

"Ascribe unto the Lord, O ye mighty, ascribe unto the Lord glory and strength," that is, "Sing a doxology" is just what the Hebrew has, for among the Hebrews there were men inspired, who saw that the blood of animals was not acceptable to JEHOVAH.

A careful, strictly Conservativ revision of the Psalter was

* A Lent lecture delivered in St. Luke's Church, Southampton.

executed in 1920 at the instance of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Church of Ireland adopted it into the P.B., but we in England were too inert mentally to value a better translation, and we go on singing words we do not mean, even words which hav no sense at the present day.

Now let us look at some outstanding passages of the O.T. Take the story of Creation in Genesis i. Mention it in Hyde Park or anywhere where disputatious men gather, and a shout wil go up that it is "unscientific." Let be this criticism for a moment. And let us try to think what kind of an account wou'd be given to-day in a scientific lecture or journal. Natural Science has been steadily growing for centuries. The increase of knoledg has been immense. Subjects hav been divided up, because they hav expanded beyond the reach of one mind.

So if we ask to-day for an account of the origin of the Universe we must call in the Astronomer and the Biologist and the Physicist and other men of science. Each wil be worth hearing. We shal be given many interesting facts and theories founded on the facts. The whole account wil be full of wonders, but we shal stil feel, as Christians, unsatisfied.

For the stirring of religious feeling within us makes us want to see a Meaning and a Purpose in this vast Universe. Are we to liv like cattle browsing and sleeping and in the end perishing without hearing any call to higher things ? Or, Is there not a King of all the Worlds, Who wil be our guide and direct our lives to some useful and happy end ?

As Christians we need a religious account of this vast Universe; we need a summary account for daily use and meditation. We are given this in Genesis i. The first three verses teach us that God was at work bringing light and life into our Universe. Over an empty waste of water shrouded in darkness the spirit of God brooded, the breath of God breathed, and then came light without which no life can liv.

Let me giv just a few verses to sho the beginning and the end of this, The Religious Story of the Universe:

"In the beginning when God created the heaven and the earth, the earth was a waste and empty; and darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the spirit of God brooded upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day."

This is the beginning of the story of Creation; now hear the end:

"And the heaven and the earth were finisht, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God finisht his work which he had made."

God had done his part, now it was for man to do his. The theme is, God made the Universe for Man: hence MAN's duty of thankful praise. Take a poet's description of Adam and Eve in the Garden:

" Both turnd and under op'n skie ador'd
 The God that made both skie, Air, Earth and Heav'n
 Which they beheld, the Moon's resplendent Globe
 And starrie Pole: Thou also mad'st the Night,
 Maker Omnipotent, and Thou the Day,
 Which we in our appointed work employd
 Have finisht happie in our mutual help
 And mutual love, the Crown of all our bliss
 Ordaind by Thee . . . "

Paradise Lost, iv. 721-729
 (ed. H. C. Beeching).

Deuteronomy again is a book which contains teaching which is fundamental for Christians. In Deuteronomy is blazoned the announcement which is a foundation stone of Christianity even as it was of the old Hebrew religion, " JEHOVAH thy God, JEHOVAH is one; and thou shalt love the LORD thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might" (Deut. vi. 4).

One God, and to Him alone must be paid the devotion of man's whole nature. We Christians, let us never forget, worship One God as truly as Jews and Muslims. " I and the Father are one," Jesus said (John x. 30). And when Arian ideas were broadcast in the Church in the fourth century, and hethen-minded men were prepared to accept our Lord as a demi-god, a secondary deity, it was (we may believe) the stedy witness of the O.T. to the Unity of God which helpt to keep Christian teaching true. So the Church kept the great word Trinity, which means *not* " Three " *but* " Three in One." But what was it (we may ask at this point) that induced the hethen to worship many gods or spirits ? Surely it was Fear. Any calamity, storm, flood, earthquake, pestilence made them ask in panic, Which of the many unseen powers hav we offended ? In Deuteronomy Israel was taught that all things come from the One God: " Thou shalt fear JEHOVAH thy God and him shalt thou serve, and shalt swear by his name " (Deut. vi. 13). In calamity thou shalt fear, *i.e.* *look to* JEHOVAH only; in all the transactions of daily business thou shalt swear by his name, *i.e.*, *remember him*; in short, in everything thou shalt be his servant and worshiper.

Deuteronomy vi. 4, 5; viii. 2, 3:

" Hear, O Israel, JEHOVAH our God, JEHOVAH is one; and thou shalt love JEHOVAH thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and

with all thy strength. . . . And thou shalt remember all the way which JEHOVAH thy God hath led thee these forty years in the wilderness, that he might humble thee, to prove thee, to know what was in thine heart, whether thou wouldest keep his commandments, or no. And he humbled thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know; that he might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of JEHOVAH doth man live."

Our God asks for a worship single, undistracted by thoughts of various gods who are to be appeased in various ways, a worship untroubled by fear of evil spirits. Turn we now to the book of Kings.

There is an old scoff against the O.T. to the effect that it is a book about wars and the names of Jewish kings. Something like that might be said of almost any book of history. But all history has lessons for those who wil lern, and Jewish History is no exception. I wil pick out just one episode, becaus it teaches a lesson for all time, tho' the passage is one that is seldom read.

2 Kings xiv. 23 ff.:

" In the fifteenth year of Amaziah son of Joash king of Judah Jeroboam the son of Joash king of Israel began to reign in Samaria, [and reigned] forty and one years. And he did that which was evil in the sight of JEHOVAH; he departed not from all the sins of Jeroboam the son of Nebat. . . . He it was who restored the border of Israel from the entering in of Hamath unto the sea of the Arabah, according to the word of JEHOVAH, the God of Israel. . . . For JEHOVAH saw the affliction of Israel, that it was very bitter: for there was none shut up nor left at large—i.e., there was no one known or unknown, to come forward as a helper for Israel. And JEHOVAH said not that he wou'd blot out the name of Israel, so he saved them by the hand of Jeroboam the son of Joash."

God has a work for sinners in this world. This soldier-sinner was allow'd to do a bit of work for God: he became the Saviour of his people. A sinner may be God's servant.

I must, of course, refer to the Prophets. I might select many passages from their writings, but I choose only one, becaus it is illustrativ of their general teaching. For the prophets were above all things Upholders of the Right and Opponents of Wrong especially in High Places. They spoke out and they also gallantly suffered in order to check oppression. Elijah and NABOTH'S VINEYARD is only one instance of brave prophetic championship. Here are extracts from the writings of two prophets, Amos and Hosea, who were Elijah's successors in the task of defending the opprest in Israel.

Hosea vi. 6 and Amos v. 11, 12, 21-24:

" For I desire mercy (or loving kindness), and not sacrifice; and the knoledg of God more than burnt offerings." . . . " Forasmuch as ye trample upon the poor, and take exactions from him of the wheat: ye hav

built houses of hewn stone, but ye shal not dwell in them . . . ; ye that afflict the just, that take a bribe, and that turn aside the needy in the gate of judgment from their right. . . . I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delite in your solemn assemblies. Yea, tho' ye offer me your burnt offerings and your meat offerings, I will not accept them; neither will I regard the peace offerings of your fat beasts. Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as an overflowing stream."

Heer is not only a denunciation of oppression, but also a lesson for outwardly religious people, such as our Lord givs in Matt. ix. 13 and again in xii. 7, where he quotes, from Hosea, "I desire mercy and not sacrifice." Amos amplifies the lesson and declares in the name of JEHOVAH that sacrifices and religious worship in general are unacceptable, even hateful to God, if they are offered by unmerciful men who persist in oppression and injustice. Piety in church only offends the Almighty when it is coupled with harshness and unfair dealing outside.

What is the special value of the Psalms ? It resides in the spiritual experiences of the Psalmists. Many (most) of the Psalms are personal confessions, telling something of the crisis of a man's life. One of the enemies of Religion is CYNICISM, the spirit that always sees the bad side of a man's character, or the dark side of a situation, and never the reverse. The Psalmists are healthy and honest observers: They can see both Good and Evil. Take as an instance:

Ps. xxxvii. 25: "I have been young and now am old; Yet hav I not seen the righteous forsaken, Nor his seed begging their bread." A good many people cou'd say the same, but they don't say it, either because they hav not taken notice, or becaus they are afraid of cynical acquaintances laughing at them.

Psalm xxxii. 1-5 (a deep spiritual experience). Sin unconfest brings misery, while Repentance brings Peace and Strength.

"Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered.

Blessed is the man unto whom JEHOVAH imputeth not iniquity,
And in whose spirit there is no guile.

When I kept silence, my bones waxed old
Through my roaring all the day long.

For day and night thy hand was heavy upon me:

My moisture was changed, as with the drought of summer. SELAH
I acknowledged my sin unto thee, and mine iniquity did I not hide:
I said, I will confess my transgressions unto JEHOVAH;

And thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin. SELAH"

One more Psalm let me cite, specially becaus it is not so wel known as it shou'd be. Ps. cxxxix. is a meditation on the Omnipresence and Omnipresence of God. The Psalmist is one who seems to hav travel'd in distant lands, and is certainly one who has fled to secret places to escape the pursuit of his enemies.

His hethen contemporaries held that a man who had fled from his own country or district had lost the protection of his own God. The Psalmist of Ps. cxxxix. on the contrary tells us how even in his flight his God had been with him and comforted him. No Christian either ancient or modern ever felt more truly the presence of God with him throu' all the vicissitudes of his life than this Hebrew of old time. Psalm cxxxix. 1-10:

" JEHOVAH, thou hast searcht me, and known me,
 Thou knowest my downsitting and my uprising,
 Thou understandest my thought from afar.
 Thou searchest out my path, and my forest-bed,
 And art acquainted with all my ways.
 For there is not a word in my tongue,
 But lo, thou O LORD knowest it all,
 Thou hast beset me from West and from East,
 And laid thine hand upon me.
 Such knoledg is too wonderful for me,
 It is higher than I: I cannot attain unto it,
 Whither shal I go from thy spirit ?
 Or whither shal I flee from thy presence ?
 If I ascend unto heaven, thou art there;
 If I make Sheol my bed, lo ! thou art there.
 If I take the wings of the breeze of the Dawn,
 And alight on the uttermost shore of the West,
 Even there shal thy hand lead me,
 And thy right hand shal hold me."

There are three books in the O.T., Job, Ecclesiastes, and Proverbs, which hav been classed in modern times as Wisdom Literature. This "Wisdom" of the Hebrews is rather like what we shou'd call Philosophy to-day. In the books I hav just now mentioned fundamental questions of religious philosophy are askt, *e.g.*, as to the worth of life, or the existence of a moral government over the World. Sometimes in default of finding satisfactory answers the authors turn to consider problems of everyday life, and they sometimes content themselves with giving worldly-wise maxims just for the day's work. But in any case they teach that true Wisdom is JEHOVAH's possession and that men receev it from him, and so that Wisdom is one of the best things of life. Even if the crowd does not value it, it proves its own value. So I giv one among the many meditations on Wisdom set forth in the three books.

Ecclesiastes ix. 13-16:

" I hav also seen wisdom under the sun on this wise, and it seem'd grate unto me: There was a little city and few men within it: and there came a grate king against it, and besieged it, and built grate bulwarks against it: now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city; and the commonalty remembered not that poor man. And I for my part say, Wisdom is better than might, tho' the wisdom of the poor man is despised and his cause gains no hearing."

In discussing the O.T. we must not forget that the Church of England in the VIth of the XXXIX. Articles adds to the list of the books of the O.T. the books call'd Apocrypha, books "of the second rank" we may call them. But there is spiritual profit to be gained among these. I quote from the book of *Jesus the son of Sirach* (otherwise *Ecclesiasticus*) the noble lesson which is taught us in the Lord's Prayer, that " Unless we forgiv, we cannot be forgivn."

Ecclesiasticus xxviii. 1-5:

" He that taketh vengeance shal find vengeance from the Lord,
And his sins will be remember'd.
Forgiv thy neighbour the hurt that he hath done thee,
And then thy sins shal be pardon'd when thou prayest.
Man cherisheth anger against man;
And doth he seek healing from the Lord ?
Upon a man like himself he hath no mercy;
And doth he make supplication for his own sins ?
He being himself flesh, nourisheth wrath;
Who shal make atonement for his sins ?"

My last quotation is from the book of Daniel, from ch. xii. Many questions hav been raised about the book, and about its date. But it is most probable that ch. xii. belongs to the period of the heroic preest Mattathias who raised the Jews in revolt circ. 168 B.C., when Antiochus Epiphanes tried to force them to sacrifice to Zeus Olympios (2 Macc. vi. 2), and thereby to break the Mosaic covenant to worship only JEHOVAH the One God. There were many martyrs for Monotheism in those days, both among the preests and teachers, and among the common people. Ultimately the Maccabees, the sons of Mattathias, won freedom to worship as their fathers had worshiped; but what return cou'd be made to the martyrs who died without seeing freedom won? To the writer of Dan. xii. it was revealed that they shou'd be glorified in LIFE AFTER DEATH.

Daniel xii. 1-3:

" And at that time shal Michael stand up, the grate prince which standeth for the children of thy people: and there shal be a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation unto that same time: and at that time thy people shal be deliver'd, every one that shal be found written in the book. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shal awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt (' abhorrence,' marg.). And they that be wise (' the teachers,' marg.) shal shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."

These are words which our Lord Himself might hav spoken over his Disciples as a last message to the World.

W. EMERY BARNES.

(NOTE.—Believing in the need for a conservativ revision of our spelling, I hav used some revised spellings above.—W. E. B.)

YOUTH: A PASTOR'S SELF-EXAMINATION

THE Jubilee appeal of the Prince of Wales brings again prominently before us the problem of Youth. Bishop Gore is said to have remarked that he had a permanently troubled conscience with reference to social problems. It is most desirable that we parish priests and other priests with similar opportunities should have a permanently troubled conscience in respect of our duty towards Youth. Having regard to the undoubted fact that the right attitude of the Church towards its younger members is of primary importance, is it not desirable that we should keep constantly in front of us the very definite injunctions given to us in this matter by our Lord Himself? Otherwise are we not in danger of losing this day of grace "and of being ashamed before Him at His coming" because of our failure to use rightly the many opportunities which are continually given us? It is the object of this brief note to call attention again to these injunctions and to base on them a series of self-examination questions—questions which are the result, not of armchair study, but of experience gained through contact with souls, and which it is hoped will trouble our consciences and send us afresh to our tasks and our prayers.

Our Lord charged His followers to make disciples (*μαθητεύσατε*), to admit them by baptism as members of His School in the new Assembly, and there to teach them to keep all the Dominical Commandments, the new Torah (St. Matt. xxviii. 20). There would be no doubt in the minds of His hearers as to the full meaning of these words. It was the duty of every teacher to gather round him a large number of disciples. "Be deliberate in judgment" was a well-known saying of the men of the Great Assembly, "and raise up many disciples" (Aboth, i. 1). Baptism, along with circumcision and sacrifice, admitted a proselyte to the Jewish fold (Sifre Numbers, § 108). One so admitted took upon himself all the law without qualification (Galatians v. 3), an obligation which he renewed every time he said the Shema (M. Berakoth, ii. 2). The Apostles were the new order of scribes instructed into the Kingdom (*πᾶς γραμματεὺς μαθητευθεὶς τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν*, Matt. xiii. 52), with the important duty of giving instruction to others. Of them the Rabbinical saying might be repeated: "To learn and not to teach—there is nothing more futile than that."

But further, everything must be done that can possibly be done to keep the disciple, once enrolled and instructed, steadfast in his discipleship. Our Lord solemnly charged St. Peter, and with St. Peter all the shepherds of Christ's flock, to feed His

lambs, shepherd His sheep, feed His sheep (*βόσκε τὰ ἀρνία μου. ποίμαινε τὰ προβάτια μου. βόσκε τὰ προβάτια μου*, St. John xxi. 16, 17). The young must be lovingly cared for; their chief need is food. The older members of the flock require guidance as well as food. St. Peter speaks of the food as "the sincere milk of the word" (*τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα*, I. Ep. ii. 2), the tasting of which brings even to "babes" personal experience of Christ; the guidance is that oversight gladly and eagerly given in a spirit of gentleness and humility which is the shepherd's special task (I. St. Pet. v. 2 *ff.*: *ποιμάνατε τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν ποίμνιον τοῦ θεοῦ*).

Such thoughts would naturally recall the well-known Psalm xxiii. "The Lord is my Shepherd," *יְהִי רֹעֵה*, becomes in the Septuagint *κύριος ποιμαίνει με*. Verse 2 speaks of "food," the "green pastures"; verse 3 of "guidance," "he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness." The "rod" (*שֶׁבֶט*, *ἡ ράβδος*) in verse 4 is a weapon to ward off wild beasts or robbers (cf. St. John x. 10, 12); the staff (*מִשְׁעֵד*, *ἡ βακτηρία*) is "the shepherd's crook for steadyng his steps on uneven ground, and for helping the sheep in an *impasse*" (W. E. Barnes, *The Psalms*, vol. i., p. 118).

Having then placed in front of us once again the Master's great charge and tried to discover all that it means, we shall do well as Christian pastors afresh to examine ourselves as to our response in a matter of such vital importance. It is convenient to take in our self-examination the order suggested above—food, guidance and protection—though students of human nature will know quite well that the need for guidance comes much earlier in the lives of some young people than of others.

1. Do I put this work of feeding Christ's lambs in the forefront of my ministry? Am I ready to lay aside many tasks of lesser importance in order to undertake that which my Lord has put first? Do I teach and minister to boys and girls when they are quite young or do I leave them almost entirely to Sunday School teachers? Do I feed them with "the sincere milk of the word," Gospel truth and sacramental grace, when they are ready to learn anything, or do I wait for my teaching until this receptive period has passed? Do I endeavour to train them in the life of Christian discipleship? Do I see to it, so far as it is in my power, that each young life is being definitely attracted to Jesus Christ, drawn into conscious discipleship, "tasting that the Lord is gracious"?

2. Do I watch over them in their growing years? Am I conscious of the difficulties they experience? Am I ever angry or vexed with a child? Do I try to understand their point of view? Do I try to gain their confidence? Am I accessible

to them at definite times ? Do I know if they say their prayers—morning prayers as well as night prayers ? Do I know if they are regular at Divine Worship on Sundays ? Have I taught them what worship means ? Do I pray regularly and earnestly for them ?

3. Do I shepherd as well as try to feed them in their growing years ? Am I attempting to provide the right spiritual pasture ? Am I leading them to fresh pastures when the need arises in which the soul can respond to the movement of the Holy Spirit, and the spiritual growth keep pace with the physical and mental ? Are they still ready and willing to confide in me ? If not, is it through any fault of mine ? Do I know when they are in moral dangers of any kind ? Do I take steps lovingly and wisely, leaving no stone unturned, to shield them if need be, as the Good Shepherd shields His sheep from wolves or robbers ? Do I realize that there are often difficulties in the lives of these young people unknown perhaps to anyone and in which the priest alone can help ?

4. Do I follow them up when they leave school ? Do I know anything about their surroundings in their new life ? Do I hunt them out at the first sign of slipping away and of growing indifferent to religious practices ? Am I aware of the difficulties these adolescents often experience at this time of storm and stress ? Am I in close touch with them as in former times ? Am I ready as far as human endeavour under the direction of God's Holy Spirit can be, to help these sheep in an *impasse* ? Do I strive constantly to keep myself equipped for the task of dealing with spiritual, moral and intellectual difficulties ? If, through no fault of my own, I cannot follow nor keep a close hold on them, do they know that I still care, that to lose one lamb or sheep from the Master's flock is to the shepherd a cause of suffering ? Do I ever shew any signs of impatience or lack of sympathy when they are fickle or wayward ? Do I realize that one unsympathetic or harsh word may be enough to crumple them up, to send them into their shell, to drive them perhaps from sacramental grace, and to destroy any possible chance of helping them ? Am I ready to welcome them back after any kind of lapse, making gladly the first advance ? Do I pray for them diligently and regularly during their years of adolescence ?

5. Am I also in close touch with the well-to-do young people so far as is permitted to me ? Am I ready to receive to spiritual guidance the rich as well as the poor, to teach and shepherd them as fearlessly as their less fortunate fellows ? Do I realize that human nature is much the same everywhere, and that difficulties, though often of varying nature, are not confined to any one class ? Am I patiently working and praying for these young souls as

they too pass through stormy periods and periods perhaps of indifference to Divine things? Do I work and pray as believing with God's grace the day of vision and joyous service may break at any moment?

6. Am I still the friend and guide when manhood is dawning? Have I still their confidence in their new world of freedom and varying interests? Am I as accessible to them as in former years? Have I a real belief in the possibility of saintliness as well as of service? Do I endeavour to provide all that a priest can with the help of God to meet the needs of their new experiences, the fresh pastures to which their soul should move? Am I constantly and prayerfully endeavouring with real humility to bring them to full maturity in a life that is hid with Christ in God?

R. D. MIDDLETON.

DIVINE PERSONALITY*

THE discussion of divine personality must begin with the removal of misconceptions of what is meant by personality in general, and by the particular phrase "the personality of God." It is hardly worth while to delay over the childish mistake of thinking that "three persons" means three men: no intelligent being should ever make such a mistake, and the allegation that this expression, with others like it, fosters anthropomorphic ideas in the popular mind is simply nonsense. We have to deal with deeper objections than that. There is an idea, popularized by theosophy and by the newly invented anthroposophy, that personality is a limiting or confining conception, and that as the ideal for man is to escape from the fetters of personal existence, it is impossible to conceive of God ever being bound and limited by those fetters. If this view were confined to theosophists and anthroposophists it would be a nuisance because of its growing popularity, while remaining philosophically negligible. But it is also held by some (not all) of the mathematical school of philosophers, who tend to identify abstractness with reality and to regard the entirely abstract as the ultimately real. So supported, the view demands consideration.

I

It is not, I think, unfair to suggest that these philosophers are letting their philosophical thought be influenced by the methods and principles of their mathematical science. Mathe-

* A paper read before the Lunesdale Clerical Society, July 5th, 1934.

matics (as the Greek philosophers saw, though they forgot it occasionally) deals with abstractions, even in its lowest stages. Other sciences, such as biology, deal in the first instance with real and actual individual exhibits, and experiment upon tangible things: but mathematics deals with figures that have no substantive existence, for there never really existed a plane surface of only two dimensions, nor was there ever a figure devoid of colour and of all the other attributes which mathematicians abstract and leave out of account. Further, just as they have a geometry of two dimensions by abstracting the third, they have also imagined a geometry of four, five, and more dimensions, which is interesting mental gymnastic, but has no touch with things as they are, for tridimensional space is the only space we know, or can imagine. So, I suggest, they carry along this idea of the reality of the abstract, when they leave their own science and come to philosophize, tending to regard the unqualified as the ultimate real, and to think that qualification is necessarily limitation. In consequence, personality, which means the possession of certain attributes, becomes to them a limiting conception; and, of course (as they would admit), the same would be the case with any other predication of attributes which went beyond the mere statement of existence, or the use of the substantive verb.

But I suggest that it is better to approach the subject from a less abstract standpoint, and even to begin (as the biologist does) by asking how the problem works out in known and observed cases. In current speech personality means the product of those attributes by virtue of which one has at the same time a character, a value, and a purpose of one's own, and is associated with others of similar constitution, and with the whole outside world, in a complicated system of relationships. Personality is more than individuality, both as involving within itself its own reasons for existence, and as being in relationship and not in isolation. The person, in fact, is himself full of meaning, and also reaches out beyond himself to mean things to others. It seems to agree with this, that we speak of a "great personality" not as one with great limitations, but as one great in his own character and great in the influence of his character outside of himself. An unqualified entity—that is, an entity without cognizable attributes—would be unknowable, and for practical purposes non-existent; for everything knowable must have attributes by which it is known. There are attributes, such as size, colour, situation, etc., which are limiting attributes; but I suggest that the attributes which constitute personality are not limiting attributes, seeing that by them the person has both his proper value and his capability of influence, both

his intrinsic greatness (such as it may be) and his power of expansion.

Now man is a limited or finite being, and so his personality is limited, not because it is personality, but because it is the personality of a man. Consequently man is limited in his exercise of the attributes which constitute personality, both by reason of his own inherent limits, and also because of the limits imposed by his environment and by the coexistence with him of other persons possessing, like himself, the power of expansion beyond themselves. This is the source of both clash of personalities and individual futility. But if we may suppose that there is a Being possessing personal attributes, yet unlimited by any confinement in time or space, or by any restriction of power, it would follow that (He himself being unlimited) His personal attributes, so far from being a limitation to Him, would themselves be unlimited in scope, and only limited in action by the determination of His own will, for the will is a constituent factor in personality. We should also need to suspect that, though our own personal attributes are in some sense akin to those attributes of the Eternal which we call personal, yet in the Eternal those attributes would as far transcend ours as do (shall we say ?) His power and glory. For example, love is a personal attribute or activity; yet even in men that faculty, though at root the same, varies immeasurably in its actual content from man to man; and one would suspect that the love of God would, just because it is so much greater than ours, be also infinitely different, and yet at root the same, namely the desire to give.

This comparison between personality human and divine admittedly involves an assumption, namely that there is a certain kinship or likeness of constitution between God and man. This is expressed in the Old Testament by the statement that man was made in the image and after the likeness of God, and in Christian theology by the doctrine of the Creative Word or Reason of God lightening every man that cometh into the world. I submit that there is nothing anthropomorphic in such a conception; for anthropomorphism is the invention of gods in the form of men, whereas this is a statement that God made man like Himself. But one might expect to be asked what is the justification for such a statement, and on what authority it is made; and I venture to suggest that our answer would be as follows.

Man is able to commune with man because men are of like mental constitution with each other; and an easy induction from that would lead to the affirmation that such communion is possible only where likeness of constitution exists. Further, it has been the experience of men in all ages that communion

with God is not only possible, but actually takes place. Such experience, for those who have it, is too real a thing for them ever to admit that it is an hallucination or a state of mind induced by the imagination: it is as much an assured fact of experience as toothache or a conversation with a friend. If we may assume that such experience of divine communion is a fact, it will follow that there is at least sufficient likeness of constitution between God and man to make this communion possible; and seeing that reason precludes us from inventing a God in human form, we are bound to do the opposite and affirm that God the Creator made man in some sense like Himself, and that we may therefore assume that what we recognize as our own highest attributes have their prototype in God Himself. In short, the observed fact of the human experience of divine converse has been made the ground of an inductive reasoning, first as to the relationship between God and man, and then as to the attributes of God; and this process of thought from fact of experience to theological statement is precisely the same process as that by which any science proceeds from observed fact to scientific "law."

II

On such grounds as the foregoing our argument continues, assuming that under certain safeguards it is legitimate to work by inductive reasoning from human attributes to divine. If it is the case that communion with God is possible because men are in God's image and likeness, then it would seem to follow that what we know to be the highest attributes of manhood have their prototype in the divine nature: but it would also be necessary (as a safeguard against illegitimate deductions) to remember that the attributes of the Infinite and Eternal, because they are infinitely greater, are also immeasurably different in their scope and quality from the human attributes which are their reflexion: and moreover, in view of human finitude, it would be right to admit that there may be secrets and mysteries in the divine nature into which the human intelligence or imagination cannot (or at least has not yet been able to) penetrate. In other words, there is room in the science of theology for an admission of ignorance; as in fact in every science there are points at which the experimenting intellect finds itself unable to proceed further, and has to make a guess or conjecture to cover the necessities of its subject.

An example of this last procedure is the physicists' conjecture as to the existence and properties of what is called the æther, which appears to be an entity, pervading the whole of space and all the things which occupy space, not to be apprehended

either by chemical analysis or by physical experiment, yet assumed to exist because its existence is necessary as an explanation of known physical or chemical phenomena. Also, though its existence seems to be universally admitted, there appears to be some doubt as to its properties, for thirty years ago (I seem to remember) it was regarded as a perfectly elastic fluid, but now I understand that it is regarded as a perfectly rigid solid. But, however that may be, the postulating of its existence because it is necessary as an explanation of things observed is an admission of ignorance, for it is a confession that there are secrets to which science has not yet penetrated; and it is also somewhat akin to the act of faith by which the religious mind is prepared to assume what it does not understand, in the hope both of explaining what it has experienced and of understanding more.

We seem, then, to be justified in arguing from human attributes to divine, provided we remember that the limitations of those human attributes do not of necessity apply to their divine prototypes. Probably the most characteristic attribute of human personality (after the awareness of one's own existence and value) is the sense of responsibility for one's actions; which is the same as to say that one has a deep-rooted conviction that certain actions *are* one's own actions. On this sense of responsibility depends that attitude of mind which will accept or administer either praise or rebuke, as the quality of any action or policy seems to require: for unless there were responsibility, both praise and rebuke, both reward and penalty, would be out of place: the quality of the actions might still be subject to such judgements, but the actor himself (being irresponsible) would be free from them. Now the sense of responsibility demands as its background the fact of freedom: responsibility implies that the actions are our own, and if they are our own, then we must have been free to do them or not to do them. And so personality implies (within limits) the power of self-determination, the possession of a mind which one can "make up," and of a will which is free and is the determining factor in activities. The fact that we must recognize limits is due (as I said before) not to personality in itself, but to the necessities imposed by a material body and a material environment, as well as to the coexistence with us of other persons possessing similar characteristics: but those limitations of freedom are in the environment, not in the will itself, which at the critical moment remains the determining factor, and even in an enforced action can maintain its freedom by withholding its assent.

If we are right in supposing that freedom of the will is an essential factor in personality, and one of the highest of human

attributes, we shall be naturally disposed (on the principle already mentioned) to think that in the divine nature there is something which is akin to, while infinitely transcending, the freedom of which we are conscious in ourselves. And while the freedom (like the knowledge) of one unlimited by conditions of space or time is so far different from such freedom as we are conscious of that we cannot hope to make an exhaustive survey of its content, we can at least say this, that God cannot be less free than man is, and that therefore He cannot be supposed to be conditioned by the circumstances of things which He has created. For example, if the universe is a mechanical unity, God is outside the machine, not a part of it, or subject to the laws of its working; or if (as it is better to say) the universe is an organic unity, God is outside the organism, and is not subject to the laws of its growth. For even a man who makes a machine is outside of it, and able by his independent judgement to regulate its working; and though man has not yet made an organism, yet even men (e.g. horticulturalists) are not without control over the growth and development of the organisms which they have not made. So it would seem to be a natural and very legitimate induction, that if there is a God who can draw to Himself the respect and affection of men, He must be at any rate not less free than they are, and must therefore be able to control and regulate His own handiwork.

From this conclusion there are some obvious deductions to be drawn. One of them is the possibility of what is known as *miracle*—that is, that God sometimes acts (or at least is capable of acting) after a manner which is not commonly observed in the ordinary course of nature. Correlative with that is the possibility that prayer, or request to God, is not entirely otiose and useless. Of course, if God cannot act independently of the machine or the organism, or at least unless God can regulate the details of the working of the machine or the organism, prayer is inconceivable. But if God is free, then prayer must be admitted to be permissible and not incapable of effect. Therein lies the difference between what is known as "*theism*," which is the doctrine of a free and living God, and "*deism*," which was an attempt to formulate a doctrine of a God who made the world and as it were wound it up like a clock, and then took no further interest in it.

We have already seen that human personality, and the freedom which it implies, are limited in scope: they are limited with the limitations of humanity. It is a conceivable question what, if any, are the limitations of divine freedom. There are obviously the limitations which God's will has imposed upon itself by the creation of other personalities to whom He has

granted freedom; for evidently, in making and leaving us free, He has determined that, though He in theory has power to constrain the human will, He will not use that power. Also it is conceivable that God is limited with the limitations of the divine nature. What these may be it is beyond our power to conjecture, except that we may with reason suppose that God cannot contradict Himself or belie His own goodness. In the world as we know it, this divine self-consistency expresses itself in what we describe as the uniformity of nature or natural law; and in the sphere of ethics it justifies the assumption that there is (if we can apprehend it) an absolute moral law, and that (even if that law in its perfection has not been apprehended) there is something dangerous in the reckless scrapping of moral codes which have been found in practice to tend towards what may reasonably be supposed to be the good estate of human society. But above all, this conception of divine self-consistency is justification for our conviction that goodness in all its forms is more than mere human utility, more even than a human aspiration, but that perfect goodness exists as an attribute, or even as the sum of the attributes, of One who is approachable and lovable and worshipful, and is able to communicate His goodness to those who by converse with Him are willing to assimilate it from Him and thereby be assimilated to Him.

III

It has been suggested above that it is of the essence of personality to be in relationship. Personality reaches its full development and comes to the realization of itself in association with others. If it were possible for one to be in such absolute isolation as to have no converse at all with others of like nature with himself, such a one would be, or would become, something less than a man. A man is not only known by the company he keeps, but also rapidly becomes assimilated to the level of that company; which is probably the reason why chaplains whose work lies among criminals, and chaplains whose work lies among atheists and unbelievers, need to be more abundantly men of God, so as not to be assimilated to the level of their company. But to be utterly isolated, both from man and from God, would be to forfeit manhood altogether. If, then, personality as we know it necessarily involves relationship, it involves the existence of other persons with whom we can be in relationship. Can we say that something of the same kind is necessarily involved in the personality of God? Can we, that is to say, suggest that it is inconceivable for God ever to have existed alone in solitary individuality? Or can we say that, although

it is unlikely that, apart from the revelation which God has given of Himself, we should have been able by our own thought to work out a theory of His tripersonality, yet when the revelation is given to us by the knowledge of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, we find this entirely in harmony with what we should expect, and accept it as a solution of a difficulty which otherwise would have pressed itself upon us? The Aristotelian suggestion of God eternally contemplating Himself has a certain artificiality: but the Christian doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, eternally in communion in the unity of the divine Being, answers the question which the philosopher almost raised but could not answer. I say "almost raised," because the question of divine relationships could not become really pressing except in view of the doctrine of personality. To the Greeks it was easy enough to depersonalize the divine into *τὸ Θεῖον*. To the Christian, who sees God in Jesus Christ, such a thing is impossible. God is personal: and therefore we must ask about His relationships.

There are probably many more considerations which might arise. We must be satisfied with one of them. If personality is a divine attribute, it is a very sacred thing: and if God has given man personality, that also is sacred and it is to be expected that God Himself will respect it. And as personality involves freedom of the will, God will respect that freedom and will use no constraint such as by destroying freedom would destroy or impair personality. Therefore God will not either save or destroy men in spite of themselves. But further, if men by their own act impair their freedom, they not only sink below the level of their own proper selves, but they at the same time destroy or impair that sacred thing which is the image of God in themselves, and so commit sacrilege against themselves and against God whose image they bear. And that is a matter which God must take notice of. May we say, then, that if human sin is a consequence of the misuse of human freedom, the impairing of God's image in man which results is something for which God, almost in His own interests (or, as we should say, for His own glory), is bound to find a remedy: and seeing that He will not further impair our freedom by using constraint, He will not save us in spite of ourselves or independently of our own will, but will use persuasion and not force, and will save us from within ourselves and not from outside? And if the tragedy of sin is that it impairs that personality by which we are capable of divine communion and therefore of a divine destiny, God's remedy, from within, not from without, is (so to speak) ready to His hand in that the human nature which calls for restoration is so akin to His own nature that the Word or

Son of God, Who is the prototype of human personality, can without impairing His own proper deity take that human nature upon Him and work from within man for man's restoration. The error of Arianism was not merely that it imagined the Son of God to be less than the Eternal Father, but also that it placed between God and man such a barrier of diversity of nature as God Himself was unable to cross: against which error the Catholic doctrine of the true Incarnation of the consubstantial Word of God enters a protest by which it both maintains the divine glory of our Saviour and also defends the dignity and value of the manhood which is in His image.

E. EVANS.

BEZALEEL: THE ARTIST-CRAFTSMAN

THE late Dr. George Mathieson, in his book *Representative Men of the Bible*, put aside for the time all question of dogmatic theology, and looked at the Bible as a great portrait gallery. But Art has no representative figure. That there is such a one—that the gallery would not be complete without him, I hope to shew in the following article.

Exodus xxxi.: "See, I have called by name Bezaleel. . . . And I have filled him with the spirit of God, in wisdom, and in understanding . . . and in all manner of workmanship . . . that he may make all that I have commanded thee."

This was the portrait I missed as from time to time I stood in the great gallery with Dr. Mathieson. The gallery seemed so representative, so comprehensive, as to make me feel that anything left out must be of little account from the spiritual standpoint. But the spark of art in me sought for vindication. Yet, without this portrait, the gallery would not have satisfied me. It would not have been universal. And lo, one day, in a quiet corner, obscured by the light that shone from the neighbouring portrait of Moses, I found what I wanted—a representative of art—the portrait of Bezaleel, the Artist-Craftsman.

The portrait is in a dim corner of the gallery, and there is little in its lineaments to attract the attention. It reminds me of the first block-in of an oil painting. There is no definition in the features. Bezaleel has no predecessor. He finds no school or college. He has assistants, but no successor. He is an artist after the order of Melchizedek. The religious and the art world pass him by. No subsequent Bible-author refers to him; Matthew does not bring him forward to confirm an

incident or prove a doctrine. It is true that lately he has been mentioned in an interesting booklet, but by general theological consent he is a negligible figure—a minor portrait. Yet, in spite of all this, I venture to say that there is no more significant figure in the whole gallery than that of Bezaleel.

This significance is because he is an artist, while the land that gave the world this great gallery is a land without art. Her first sanctuary was modelled on the shrines of Egypt, on the sacred chest of Milton's hymn. Her first temple was Phœnician: "There is not among us any that can skill to hew timber like unto the Sidonians." Her later temples were reminiscent of Egypt, Ionia, and Persia. The graven images in which Greece bodied forth her divinities were taboo. It is questionable even if this land had an eye for nature. There was no beauty in the mountains as such—the beasts went up thereon. Standing where Ruskin did, none of its writers would have seen the Rhone "blue to the shore, and radiant to the depth." No, to the Hebrew, the office of the river was to make glad the City of God. All this is the measure of the value of Bezaleel's portrait; we do not expect to find him at all in the gallery of this non-artistic nation. And yet she not only finds a place for the artist in her gallery, but even goes so far as to invest him with a dignity and authority not usually ascribed by other nations to *their* artists.

Let us consider Bezaleel only as a portrait. There is no question of retouching. I am in the gallery only as a spectator, a reporter. Let us leave aside for the moment all questions of Higher Criticism or Lower Literalism. I may be told that the book of Exodus belongs to a late period in Israel's history, and that it was written by priestly scribes in the priestly interest. It may be that it describes conditions more appropriate to the fenced city than the open desert. The portrait may have been painted from no single model. Yet all this is quite a side issue. It is a matter of indifference to me whether Bezaleel was a real man, or as imaginary as Lear and Hamlet. Prove definitely to me that he is only a legendary figure, and I answer that you only increase his significance for me. What is this mysterious significance?

Just this. The Hebrew, the man without art, when he sets himself the task of writing the history of his people, is called upon to explain an outburst of art in an early stage of this story. How is he to do it? The circumstances may have called for the art gifts of a Bezaleel, but they could not produce them. But this non-artistic Hebrew never hesitates. This art, with its manifestations, is something too great and glorious to be explained by ordinary causes, and so he goes straight to

the fountain-head of all causes. A part of the nature of God was incarnated in Bezaleel. His art is only to be explained as the gift of God, the direct working of His Spirit. God was making use of Bezaleel, as he made use of Moses and the prophets, to carry out His designs: "These are the words that thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel; this is the pattern of the tabernacle, and the pattern of all the instruments thereof." In the person of Bezaleel, God was dwelling in man, who could do nothing of himself, but only by the Spirit that wrought in and through him.

At this stage I can imagine a criticism of the portrait silently gaining force. It is not really representative. It does not shew art at its best. It stands for constructive and decorative art, but not for fine art. It is not up to date; we have travelled a long way past it. The art it represents could not be put into a gold frame and sent up to the Royal Academy.

Let us accept these strictures for a moment. Let us take it to be only the best art the Hebrew knew. Let us decline to the level of the critic, and take it to be inferior art. And what does it shew? Only this, that the old writer saw in this low art something so mysterious and wonderful that nothing but the direct inspiration of God could produce it. Would not his sense of a divine origin be increased by every higher manifestation? If the Almighty Himself is required to inspire low art, who is to inspire high art?

But the longer I stand before the portrait, the less am I inclined to agree with the opinion that it is primitive, or even old-fashioned. Consider what constitutes the difference between our art outlook of today and that of a period not so very remote. Why, it is just this, that craftsmanship, so much valued in the Middle Ages, has today been restored to its rightful place. You had once to paint easel pictures to be an artist. Then came William Morris and Walter Crane. How often have we heard it stated that the men who built our great cathedrals "buildest better than they knew"! Architecture is now the mistress art; scarcely a year passes without seeing an architect president of one or other of the two Academies—*the* Academy, and the Royal Scottish Academy. And what of the glorious company of wise-hearted men who have carried out the internal decoration of those two buildings, Liverpool Cathedral (of which more anon) and the Scottish War Memorial.

This first critic is supposed to have come from the art world. But there is another critic, supposed to come from the religious world, who grudges Bezaleel his space on the walls. He denies him all credit. Bezaleel discovered no subtle proportions. He designed no fabrics. He made no choice of

stones or metals. In short, he did nothing—he could do nothing—of himself. He was taught by Moses to build a tabernacle, after the pattern that was shewn to Moses in the Mount. He got the plans, as we say, at third hand, and all he did was to carry them out. Therefore, he and his supposed gifts have no claim on our admiration. God could have done very well without Bezaleel.

Could He? All this reminds me of George Eliot on Stradivarius:

.... "What! Were God at fault for violins,
Thou absent?"
STRADIVARIUS. "Yes,
He were at fault for Stradivari's work.
I say, not God himself can make man's best
Without best men to help him.
'Tis God gives skill,
But not without men's hands; He could not make
Antonio Stradivari's violins
Without Antonio."

God *might* make better fiddles than Stradivarius, but what as a matter of fact God *does*, is to order His best fiddles *from* Stradivarius. The plans may exist—must exist—first in the mind of God, but Stradivarius and Bezaleel have both to recreate them in their own minds. I think this is what was in the mind of the man who painted the portrait. We must remember that he was an Oriental. We are apt to forget the difference in the methods of thinking of the East and the West. When Alexander Pope makes the trees and the rocks and the water act in a way perfectly foreign to their nature in admiration of a shepherd-girl, he leaves us cold. He only gives us a peculiarly flagrant example of the Pathetic Fallacy. This is the West at its worst. But when the old Hebrew is to our Western minds most literal and most mechanical, it is just then that he is actually most imaginative and most mystical. When the fire burns within him, when his sense of the power of God is most complete, when with the coal from the altar on his lips he can find no outlet in ordinary speech, he says that "the mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like lambs"; that "the mountains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands." This is the East at its best. The words in themselves are nothing—"the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." So I take the shewing of the pattern in the mount as the East means it, and not in the literal sense the West would mean if it used Eastern language at first hand.

I can see no other way of explaining the inspiration of the

artist. A stately fane is rising beside the Mersey. To the Gothic spirit it has added the best features of the Classic. I am not at all sure if its emergence is not one of the most notable phenomena of the present century. Men thought that the age of Faith was past, and with it the building of cathedrals. Yet, when Liverpool Cathedral is completed, it will be the noblest place of worship in the world. God had the plans of it. He was in no hurry. He never is. Then, when the balance seemed to be going over steadily to materialism, He brought them out, and handed them to Giles Gilbert Scott.

Why was the plan of this great cathedral given to a young man of twenty-one? Behold, I shew you a paradox; the inspiration of the Almighty only comes to those who, humanly speaking, could have done without it. It was upon one who was already a mighty man of valour that the Spirit of the Lord came mightily, when he slew a thousand men, and called the place Ramath-Lehi. Giles Gilbert Scott is the grandson of Sir Gilbert Scott, of Gothic Revival fame, architect for most of our notable cathedral restorations, and of Glasgow University. The poet lisped in numbers, for the numbers came. The young architect, from his childhood, dreamed of piers and arches and buttresses and towers. And while eye and memory were being filled with the best that had been done before him, his soul was on the mount. Many cathedrals were built in past times *to the glory of God*, but when He wanted to build a greater one (I quote again),

"Not God himself can make man's best
Without best men to help him,"

and so, to use Eastern language in the Eastern sense, God taught His servant, Giles Gilbert Scott, to build Him a tabernacle after the pattern that was shewn him on the mount.

But a third critic now comes forward. Like the last one, he is from the religious world. He might even be described as ultra-religious. He stands by my side and gazes at the portrait. Then he begins to speak. Bezaleel may be modern, ultra-modern, if you wish, as an exponent of art, but as expressing religion, will what he stands for endure? Let us grant him his divine inspiration. But does the inspiration continue when the need for it is past? Does he not represent a Lost Cause? Is it not true that the hour has now come when neither in Samaria, nor in Jerusalem, nor yet at Liverpool, we should worship the Father? Was it not said on the best authority, that the true worshipper should worship in spirit and in truth? And does this not exclude the sensuous aid of sight and sound? Does all this not shew that the portrait stands for something

that must sooner or later pass away? Are there not good people who maintain the that plainer the worship, the less attempt there is at beauty, the better will God be pleased; that to add beauty to purely spiritual worship is to offend God? And are not these good people right?

I do not think so. Indeed, in a very far off and ultimate sense, they displease God by mistrusting the inspiration He is ready to give. As a nation, we have followed the Hebrew in keeping steadily before us the attribute of God that we call holiness. But God has other attributes. He has chosen to give us, as one might say, gratuitously, the beauties of earth and sky and sea, whether we recognize them or not. The rose of Sharon blooms whether we behold it or not. The beauty of the bird of paradise is independent of the spectator. In the light of this, ugliness must be distasteful to God. I would leave the matter there.

And further, no faculty that reflects the nature of God can pass away. There are phases of human ability that we feel to be temporary. Military genius may in future manifest itself as beneficent organization. The acumen that forestalls the market may one day feed the multitude. But the art faculty is neither provisional nor temporary. It needs no transmutation. And so the portrait belongs to no dispensation. It stands for the things that cannot be shaken. It will outlast things that at present overshadow it. Whether there be prophecies, they shall fail. Whether there be tongues, they shall cease. Whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. When "they shall not teach every man his neighbour and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord, for all shall know Me from the least to the greatest," the teacher and the preacher will rest from their labours. But the sphere of the thought that invents and the hand that labours is inexhaustible. The power to create beauty will not pass. It has the permanence of God Himself.

JAMES A. DRON, F.E.I.S.

MISCELLANEA

RESURRECTION*

Now scowling winter is fallen at last
From his deathly tyrant-throne,
For the miracle dear of the spring is here,
And Life has come to her own:
The blossoms of thorn are praising God,
And the chimes of the bluebells ring,
And the daffodils quaff the dews and laugh
In the joy of the quickening spring.

Now the gibbet of shame hath changed its name.
'Tis the Throne of Glory, and lo !
The Wounds of the Lord are the Fount adored
Whence grace and pardon flow;
The chaplet of thorn hath roses borne
And lilies to crown our King,
For the Prince of Life hath ended the strife
In the joy of Redemption's spring.

Do Thou look on the world with those pitiful eyes,
Dear Lord, our Lover Divine,
For Faith is nigh dead, and Love has fled
From souls Thou hadst bought for Thine;
With Thy life-giving Breath raise them up from death,
And so shall glad Angels sing
High carols of praise for the healthful days
That shall gladden the earth at its Easter-birth,
With the joy of a God-given spring.

J. WYLDE.

CAPITALS OF REVERENCE

IN July 1927 Dr. Selwyn contributed to *THEOLOGY* an article "On Religious Orthography," which stated the case very clearly for and against the use of capitals in pronouns referring to the Persons of the Trinity. The matter has been discussed anew by Frs. Ronald Knox and Herbert Thurston in *The Clergy Review*, November and December 1934. Father Knox dismisses such capitals as a barbarism. (i) They disfigure the page; (ii) they distress profane eyes "with an oleaginous over-emphasis of piety"; (iii) the printer never attains uniformity. Anglican supporters of his position are content to say that they prefer the reticence of the Authorised Version and Book of Common Prayer.

Father Thurston in reply makes one point, and that a most effective one. The usage came in with the Tractarians and is now incorporated in the manuals used by compositors. That every printer, in a semi-pagan country like England, should stop when he comes to a pronoun referring

* Our readers will be interested to learn that Canon Wylde was ordained Deacon in 1866.—EDITOR.

to Christ and remember to print it differently is an asset to Christianity not to be lightly sacrificed. This surely is the point. When we speak of God as "he," we are using a form of speech which implies primarily a human being that is not a female, and in a secondary sense any animal of the male sex. That God Almighty should thus be designated is a proof of the inadequate and figurative nature of language. No possible reverence could be given or withheld by the use or non-use of a capital letter. But "he" is exactly right when applied to Jesus Christ. If in this case only we stop as we write and consciously change "he" to "He," it is an act of reverence, which may indeed be omitted without irreverence, but should not be discarded, much less scoffed at, by those who bow the head at the mention of the Sacred Name. Then what is given to the Second Person of the Trinity is naturally extended to the First and Third Persons.

There is another reason for capitals which I have not seen suggested elsewhere. In English we have to be content with "he said" to translate *εἶπεν*, *αὐτὸς εἶπεν*, and *ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν* of the Greek Testament. *αὐτός* in Greek has sometimes a technical sense, almost "the Master (saith)." This sense is particularly noticeable in the First Epistle of St. John. See i. 7; ii. 2, 6, 25; iii. 24, where *αὐτός* is used of Jesus, and iv. 10, 13, where it refers to the Father; and ii. 6; iii. 3, 5, 7, 16; iv. 17, where *ἐκεῖνος* means Jesus—to take only examples of the nominative. A particularly instructive case is ii. 6: *οὐ λέγων ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν ὁφείλει καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε καὶ αὐτὸς περιπατεῖν*: "he that saith he abideth in Him ought himself also to walk even as He walked." The sense is much clearer for the reader not familiar with the Greek when the sentence is printed thus, and therefore the translation is better. Unfortunately it is not possible to reserve capitals for passages where they are helpful in elucidating the sense, otherwise this course might be suggested. It is quite certain, however, that in popular religious literature capitals are really helpful in bringing out the sense. Whatever aesthetic objections may be raised to "He," and surely they are purely subjective, it is preferable to a continual repetition of the name of Jesus.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE THEOLOGY OF ANNOYANCE

1. STORY OF A HERO.

AN overwrought doctor left everything behind and went off on a whaler, north of Iceland. However, there was a bad accident on board, requiring amputation or a major operation anyhow. The skipper asked the doctor to perform the operation. There were antiseptics of course, but no anaesthetics, nor doctor's tools. He got the cook's carving knife, sharpened it on the carpenter's stone, and did his best. The man never moved, and when it was over, only said: "Say, Guv'nor, that knife o' yours weren't any too sharp."

He knew there were accidents and had faced them all his life. One came to him. Why make a song over it? "Animal courage"? Maybe. I wish I had a bit more.

2. STORY OF SAINTLINESS.

St. Chrysostom was driven out by the joint plots of a wicked man, a still more wicked woman, and spiteful ecclesiastics. As he did not die,

orders were sent to rush him about until he did. He was an old man, and the orders were carried out successfully. When the end was near enough, the guards let him shelter in a hut, and he died with his favourite words: "Glory be to God for all things. Amen."

The theology gives one pause—all the more coming from St. Chrysostom. God is glorified when His Will is done; surely this wickedness was not "God's Will," but against it. St. Chrysostom was not at all a pre-destinarian; like all great preachers, he was much occupied over the human will. Some sayings of his worried St. Augustine, but death makes clean issues. Empresses and Bishops did what they did in their own confused way. That was past; this remained—martyrdom, death. It was God's way, and it was good.

3. A COMMONPLACE STORY.

A certain Ego was enjoying his holiday in Wastdale. Strolling back to tea, in crossing a brook, his bootnails slipped on a boulder; he sat down and his arm broke. It is a most commonplace accident. I have heard of there being twenty-seven cases in one day in one London hospital.

Problem of pain? Oh, there was no problem about it; still less when the doctor proceeded to set it. Assured fact. The real difficulty of pain is "resentment," and there was plenty to resent—a beautiful scheme of quasi-ambitious climbs in those remaining days, just to shew he could do something before being superannuated; further, he had just finished one very delaying piece of work, and got clear for his proper business. It would be six weeks before he could start writing again. (It did take seven.)

The truly heroic mind—as in No. 1—rises superior to these little things—if, that is, you have "animal courage." The common mind, however, as here, is timid and fretful. Evil (e.g., a broken arm) is evil. There is no denying the fact, and one does resent such evils. How can that be otherwise? Yet such things constantly happen. Can one live a life of recurrent resentments? If you cannot do heroisms, nor yet saintliness, it is still possible to go by St. Chrysostom's road—"Glory be to God for all things. Amen."

"My broken arm"—why put it down to God? But that is the whole challenge. There is no pressing need to hunt through Creeds for the joy of nice things and successful things, though you can find an added joy even for them. We do pressingly need a Gospel which can redeem and glorify the nasty and annoying things.

Why should anyone imagine God wanted to break my arm? Does God delight in pain? No. What I am asking is—whether in God you can find a meaning, a glory and joy in pain. I think I can make guesses. What am I resenting? "A very commonplace accident." I daresay. It was not commonplace to me (though I have done it before). It was MY arm. It was MY intended climbs which had gone west, and MY carefully planned work which could not get done. Per consequence, it was MY resentment at the thwarting of MY will.

Resentment is the self-assertion of self-importance, but then to myself I am important, and what I rightly want constitutes the law of my life—so far as I can see.

If, just at this point, you can look into God's eyes, then you can laugh; for, in fact, our self-importance only is funny. When I had said it, I did laugh. When the hotel people did sympathize, I chaffed them, and when

the doctor pulled at the arm (not having "animal courage") I did squirms, gasps, and other useful things, but in between I chaffed him too.

The joy of knowing, the joy of doing things, the joy of succeeding—in short, of having what one wants—must be earned by long effort, and, being gained, is gone in the moment of turning to the next. The only abiding joy is the contemplation of the infinite vastness of truth and of possibility. So much effort, so many failures, so little done—but, looking into God's eyes, the glory of infinity grows into the sense of joy in one's own littleness. I do not think one can realize it except after you have done a long best to learn and to achieve. That, I suppose, is why the joy and content of helplessness rightly seems so strange to the young. A broken arm is a very tame version of Calvary, and all those other disappointments were of the most paltry. But a good many of us are paltry people, and easily fretted by paltry things.

Some things are never paltry—death, for instance. I had a sister who, just started on a truly beautiful work in Japan, had been hurried home to die of cancer. (It does happen that way to oldish women.) She did not say much to my story, but a few months later, when the end was near, she got one of the sisters to illuminate my little text, and kept it to be sent to me as a last message.

It also fits the paltry things quite nicely. A young man smashed his knee badly at football (as happens often to youngish men). I asked him: "And did you say 'Glory be to God for all things'?" He threw at me his best Sunday smile: "I did."

I seem to see the same principle in regard to science which interests me deeply. Without having done more really than dabble in it wherever I could, every bit of knowledge I do get is a huge joy. Nevertheless, I am conscious that the joy of knowing, is, in the final sense, quite secondary. The real joy is in God, in the vision of a transcendent unknowableness, of the infinite complexity and beauty of the order itself—as God does things.

It may seem a paradox, for in result one has said that the glory of science is ignorance. That would not be the whole truth, for people who know nothing do not realize how wonderful things are; they may even imagine that they know all there is, but the principle is solidly true. There is no pride like the pride of ignorance.

If I accept the paradox, then all knowledge and skill are to me a joy. I should like to possess the skill of Bradman and Perry, the real artists, or again, the knowledge of the professors. Being sub-average, I can also delight in what God has given them all the more because it is beyond me.

If I do not accept the paradox, if my joy is in knowledge itself—i.e., in *my* knowledge, then:

(a) The theories, ideas, etc., which constitute my knowledge are to me of primary importance, and that is an attitude fatal to all true science. How many of us cramp our minds by refusing to look at subjects we are not at home in.

(b) Everybody who surpasses me is a grievance, and envy is the lowest of all moral states.

(c) God has so made His world that no man shall be self-sufficient, and, unless we can find a joy in our own limitations, we live in a state of grudging, which does not make for happiness.

There is an extraordinary suggestiveness about the root principle of Sakya Muni (Buddhism) that all misery came of unfulfilled desire. Thence, the road to happiness, of peace, of rest, lay in the renunciation of desire,

which is death (nirvana). I see no alternative to it except the Christian Gospel. Limitation, failure, pain, the world is full of them, and it is just these things which most need redeeming, which God took to Himself. That was the purpose for which the worlds were made. It is not easy. I never understood that the Crucifixion was easy, yet God filled that with glory.

HERBERT KELLY, S.S.M.

P.S.—The above story is somewhat over-personal, but then annoyances always are, and I could hardly make the theological point clear without speaking of personal reactions. All the same, it is not my story, it is anybody's story; I should have preferred to leave it anonymous, but the Editor thought otherwise, and it is his right to judge.

Lately, I came on a story, better since it concerned a matter still more commonplace. St. John of the Cross and his party stopped for lunch. Unfortunately, the cook spilt the pot of rice—their main standby—into the fire. "Do not worry," said St. John, "the Lord does not mean us to have rice today." The Lord? Or was it the clumsiness of the cook? Are these alternative explanations? St. John thought not. In 2 Cor. xii. 7, ascribes his own annoyance to God, and to the devil, without thought of inconsistency.

FURTHER NOTE ON ST. LUKE II. 49

(*Vide Theology, December, 1934.*)

A THOUGHTFUL reader of our Lord's first recorded utterance may well be puzzled to conjecture what may have been the compelling considerations which led the translators, both of King James's and our R.V., to conclude, without alternative, that the article *τοῖς* in it was of the neuter gender (presumably *ἔργοις* or *οἰκήμασιν subaud.*, or some equivalent word), the earlier version pointing to occupation, the latter to locality. Would it not be more simple and natural, when we remember our Saviour's youth, and that such an age goes out more easily and spontaneously to people rather than to places or functions, to take the words which He used, expressing His gentle surprise at search having been undertaken to find Him when He might have been infallibly expected to be exactly where He was found "among His Father's people" (cf. 1 Cor. i. 11, *τῶν Χλόντων*)? Assuming that meaning, we may, by the help of a little sympathetic imagination, picture a company, of a number unknown to us, of such as Anna, *ἥ οὐκ ἀφίστατο ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ*, she, we may believe, being only an example of those who were "waiting for the consolation of Israel," and who, with Mal. iii. 1 in their minds, rightly felt that there was no better place for their waiting-time to be passed in ("He shall suddenly come to His Temple"), and being there had been noticed by Him, at previous visits, and ennobled in His mind as being in an especial sense *οἱ τοῦ πατρός*.

All this follows smoothly on our taking the article simply, as we are entitled to do, as masculine, not neuter.

CHARLES E. SEAMAN.

EMMAUS

"HE was known of them in the breaking of the bread." Thus the two disciples described their startling experience. The mystical interpretation of these words, applied to the Eucharist, has led some writers to represent our Lord's action as an actual celebration of the Holy Mysteries. The facts as recorded by St. Luke do not give support to this idea, even if such a mutilated Eucharist were possible. Some writers, thinking that it was a Eucharist, to account for the two disciples understanding what a Eucharist was, suppose that they had been present with the Apostles at the Institution; or had possibly seen their Master give thanks and break the bread at ordinary meals. No such explanations are really needed. Our habits entirely differ from those of the Jews. We are accustomed to find a roll of bread, or a piece cut from a loaf, beside our place at table. The Jewish bread or loaf was more like what we should call a large biscuit. This was broken at the beginning of the meal, and distributed to the guests. This breaking of the bread, with an appropriate thanksgiving or grace, was performed by the host, or by the head of the family. Consider what happened at Emmaus. The two disciples had set out from Jerusalem in deep despondency. They had been amazed to find the stranger who accosted them able to open to them the Scriptures, and shew that they foretold the suffering of the Christ and His consequent glory. Who could this be, so familiar with the Scriptures, with such an insight into their inner meaning, and able to expound them with such authority? On reaching Emmaus, they invited the stranger to abide with them. They would be glad to receive further instruction. Perhaps they would learn who this stranger really was. They entered the house, and supper was prepared. Then, as they approached the table, they were further amazed to find their guest quietly, and as if it were his right, assume the position of host, take the bread, bless and break it, and offer to each of them his portion. Before they could recover from their amazement at his presumption, he vanished out of their sight. Who could it be? There was no doubt about the answer.

PHILIPPIANS II. 5-8

No one who reads St. Paul's epistles can fail to be struck by the effective way in which he uses contrasts. The law and the Gospel, flesh and spirit, Abraham and Moses—with these and other contrasts we are familiar. But the most striking of all the contrasts is that between the first and the second Adam. It is used by St. Paul in dealing with the fundamental doctrines of the Resurrection and the Atonement. Would it not help towards the full appreciation of this difficult and much-debated passage, if we consider that, although unexpressed, this contrast underlay in St. Paul's mind his dealing with the Incarnation? We have in this passage contrasts between "the form of God" and "being equal with God," and between "the form of God" and "the form of a servant."

To have also expressed the contrast between the first and second Adam would have complicated the language and grammar of the passage. A further difficulty to English people lies in the fact that the word "form," which is the simplest translation of *μορφὴ*, suggests to us an idea very different from the philosophical and theological sense in which it is used

by St. Paul. (A parallel difficulty is the first suggestion to us of the word "substance," which is almost contradictory of the theological sense of the word.) The Greek word *μορφὴ* used here "describes the permanent characteristics or kind or manner of being of anything" (Gore), or as Dr. Gifford writes: "It includes the whole nature and essence of Deity, and is inseparable from them, since they could have no actual existence without it."

The first part of the passage Dr. Gore prefers to render "pre-existing in the nature of God." It is then a statement of the truth expressed by the Council of Nicæa that Jesus Christ was "of one substance with the Father," or, to use the Nicæan adverb, "truly God." How then would He regard a temptation "to be equal with God"? Since He was God, He already possessed something far beyond it. No wonder that "He counted it not a thing to be grasped." Turn to the first Adam. The temptation of the serpent to Eve, and through her to Adam, was "ye shall be as God." She saw that "it was a tree to be desired," and she grasped and ate the forbidden fruit. It was a real temptation to the first Adam who grasped it, desiring to raise himself to the exercise of new and higher powers, and really fell. Pride had a fall.

The contrast throws into higher relief the example of the humility of the Son of God. To proceed: "He emptied himself, by taking the nature of a servant, and being made in the likeness of men." This describes the act of the humiliation of the Son of Man in the Incarnation. What does emptying imply? I take a bottle of vintage port. I decant it. I fill it with water, or I leave it empty. How does my act of emptying affect the bottle? Full of wine, full of water, or empty, it is unaffected. It remains a bottle, and will do so, so long as it exists. St. Paul's picturesque term, therefore, does not imply that the Son of God laid aside the nature (form) of God.

He could not do so without ceasing to exist. "He emptied himself," says St. Paul, "by taking the nature (form) of a servant, being made in the likeness of men." The same truth is elsewhere expressed by St. Paul: "Though He was rich . . . He became poor." Without laying aside His Divine nature, He took a second nature, the nature of man. That second nature was perfect in itself. The Divine nature did not interfere with or supply the place of anything which appertained to the perfection of the human nature. The human soul and the human will continue to exist in the perfect human nature. The Incarnate Son of God is not only "truly" God, but also "perfectly" man. The two natures coexist in one person.

Quicunque gives us a parallel: "As a reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ." Of what did the Son of God empty Himself, what were the riches which He forsook, what was "the glory which I had with Thee before the world was"? Therein lies the mystery of the Incarnation. Soul and body influence and limit each other. Even acute psychology finds it difficult to define exactly that limitation. It is partially revealed by experience. So a partial revelation of the limitation accepted by the Son of God is given us. He knows not the date of the last day, He refrains from calling upon the twelve legions of angels. We may, with some justification, think that we can infer other instances.

Here St. Paul gives our Lord as an example of the lowness of mind which he has just before commended. That example, in regard to the

"be equal with God," hardly applied to his hearers, unless it suggested the temptation of Adam, and so implied the counsel "be not wise in your own conceits." But the example given in "being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself by becoming obedient, unto death, even the death of the cross," had its attraction to those who were willing to learn to refrain from a claim to any honour due to their position, and to be obedient to the call of God, even though this might involve painful humiliation, nay, even crucifixion.

J. E. SWALLOW.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. October, 1934.

This number is dedicated to Canon A. Van Hove, who has now reached the thirty-fifth year of his teaching activities in Theology and the Canon Law at Louvain University. For this reason it is occupied solely with subjects relating to the Canon Law.

It opens with an account of Professor Van Hove's career at the University up from the "Schola Minor" and the doctorate in 1900 to his Professorship. Then follow articles dealing with the theory of Dispensations and Commutations, Religious Societies and the rationale of Punishment. As regards Dispensations, it appears that as a rule those who have jurisdiction in dispensing have it also in commuting, but the *Corpus of Roman Canon Law* seems to leave the point in some doubt. These articles are very technical and do not easily lend themselves to summarizing. The article on Punishment, by Fr. W. Onclin, discusses the position of the Roman Law and of St. Thomas on this question. Restoration of broken order and retribution were the leading ideas of the Roman Lawyers; the Church Law mitigates this by bringing in the purpose of the reformation of the criminal as an application of the general Christian doctrine of forgiveness. But as regards the first and primary end of punishment, St. Thomas, it would seem, agrees with the Roman Civil Law. More and more, again, the social aspect comes into view. Only voluntary defects can be cured by punishment, when St. Thomas says that some defects are punished *sine culpa, non tamen sine causa*, he is referring rather to trials sent by God as testings of the just, or to certain laws of his time wherein the parents or the heirs of the delinquent were liable to suffer his penalty.

The number contains the usual very full book reviews and notes on happenings of interest in the various countries.

W. R. V. BRADE.

Analecta Bollandiana. Tomus LII., Fasc. iii. and iv.

This number is not so interesting as usual, though it contains some important articles, including a continuation of the catalogue of the Hagiographical Codices in the State Library at Trèves, in which that Library is peculiarly rich.

There is an interesting article, "A propos de la Vie Sahidique de S. Pachôme," describing the edition of the *Sahidic Lives of Pachomius*, which has just appeared as *Series tertia, tomus VIII.* of the *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium Scr. Coptici*. The book itself is a monu-

ment of industry, and the reviewer, P. Paul Peeters, tells us he has been waiting for it impatiently for over thirty years.

Students of Irish hagiography will be interested in a Latin Life and two Gaelic Lives of St. Comgall. The number contains an unusually large number of short reviews, *Bulletin des Publications Hagiographiques*, which occupy nearly a half of the total space. They include a notice of a new Life of Monsieur Vincent in three volumes octavo, a saint who anticipated almost the entire devotional and philanthropic output of the nineteenth century, and deserves a full-length portrait.

C. P. S. C.

Zeitschrift für die N.T. Wissenschaft. 1934. Heft 2.

The greater part of the number is devoted to two important articles on the Fourth Gospel. O. Stählin discusses Johannine eschatology; this is an unsolved problem, for how, if primitive eschatology was so completely discarded by the Evangelist, did tradition come to ascribe the Apocalypse and the Gospel to the same author? Stählin shews that the usual explanation of the discordance in the Gospel, that fragments of Synoptic tradition have been retained unassimilated, does not do justice to the facts. The Synoptic eschatology remains in the Fourth Gospel; it has not been transmuted into mysticism. The key to the problem lies in our recognizing that the Coming Kingdom and the Present Kingdom, the one day and the now, are both essential to St. John's thought. The relation between them is between what will be apparent to all and what is truly present but as yet unrevealed.

H. von Campenhausen contributes the other Johannine article, on xiii. 6-10. What is the explanation of washing the feet only as contrasted with the hands and the head? The former refers to the ordinary method of baptizing, by which the candidate stood in a shallow pool or font and was baptized by affusion: the latter to total immersion, which we may conjecture was urged as necessary by sects, especially the followers of John the Baptist. The discussion of the archaeological evidence pays a handsome tribute to C. F. Rogers, whose "great and valuable study (i.e., *Baptism and Christian Archaeology*) has not received the attention which it deserved."

W. K. L. C.

REVIEWS

THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MEDIEVAL PAPACY. By L. Elliott Binns, D.D. Pp. xvi+388. Methuen. 16s. net.

Whether or not Gibbon was justified in regarding the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire as "the greatest, perhaps, and most awful scene in the history of mankind," the work upon it which he delivered to "the curiosity and candour of the public" remains after nearly a century and a half a stupendous achievement. We may hesitate to rank him, as Professor Bury did, with Thucydides and Tacitus—themselves a curious combination—and few would adopt Sir Leslie Stephen's estimate of his book as "historically unimpeachable." The man who claims to have described "the triumph of barbarism and religion" and finds in history "little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind" challenges criticism even from those who most thoroughly enjoy "the immortal affectation of his unique manner," and Professor Bury's own labours are a sufficient indication of some directions in which Gibbon's work needs to be corrected as well as supplemented. To Dr. Elliott Binns it appears that Gibbon "not only failed to recognise the great merits of the Byzantines, but also to realise that the true successor of the Western Empire was the Papacy"; and he states in his Introduction that his volume "is therefore to be regarded definitely as a supplement to *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, and, in particular, of its final volume, where the treatment is inclined to be hurried and superficial, and where a number of small errors occur, which even Bury's comprehensive learning has failed to eliminate."

The claim is a large one, and is perhaps most safely left with a sentence from Gibbon's Autobiography: "The author himself is the best judge of his own performance; no one has so deeply meditated on the subject; no one is so sincerely interested in the event." But many readers will probably feel that the new book is better considered as an independent work without challenging so ambitious a comparison. Dr. Binns has placed students under obligation by telling straightforwardly and in reasonably chronological order in his thirteen chapters the story as in the course of prolonged study it has come to shape itself in his own mind. There are estimates, whether of Boniface VIII. or of Savonarola or of mediæval art, which may provoke questioning and difference of opinion, but at least a

writer is entitled to his own judgment for what it is worth, even if he does not persuade others to accept it. If there are perhaps not more than three sentences in the book that could fairly be regarded as in the manner of Gibbon, and some pages are rather heavily loaded, the sections are sufficiently readable to carry the attention from chapter to chapter, and the notes will provide many important indications for anyone with access to a good library. The author calls attention to the use that he has made in his text of Finke's *Acta Concilii Constantiensis*, and for this many will be grateful, since the wealth of documents contained in that collection not only gives it unusual interest and importance but has also necessitated publication at a price which in the present difficulties of foreign exchange places it, like the editions of the Acts of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon edited by Professor Schwartz, beyond the reach of most private purchasers.

After tracing the growth of Papal Power to Innocent III. and the triumph over the Empire down to the tragedy of Boniface VIII., Dr. Binns turns aside for a chapter on "The Age of Faith," which is perhaps none the worse for being provocative. The well-worn topics of the Babylonish Captivity, the Great Schism, the Conciliar Movement, and the Papal Triumph are dealt with in separate chapters which occupy nearly one-third of the book. The Fall of the Eastern Church and the Renaissance are themes so important that we wish that more space could have been allowed to them, but the latter is at any rate supplemented by an additional chapter on the Northern Renaissance. Sections on the Popes as Italian Princes, the Teutonic Revolt, and a final chapter, "The Sack of Rome: the End of an Epoch," complete a survey in regard to which the author might not unfairly say that those are likely to be the most lenient critics who are most conscious of the difficulties. As to the causes of the decline and fall of the mediæval Papacy Dr. Binns says frankly: "The longer I have pondered over this question the more complex has it become, and the more numerous the answers which might be given to it. But behind them all there seems to have lain a single, fundamental cause. This was—secularisation. From this root sprang all the other causes; they were, to change the figure, symptoms of one universal disease." We may perhaps set beside it an answer given by Freeman just sixty years ago: "The desolation, the moral death, of medieval Rome was more than the fitting penalty, it was the immediate consequence, of her twofold dominion over mankind."

CLAUDE JENKINS.

THE SCEPTICAL APPROACH TO RELIGION. New Shelburne Essays, Vol. II. By Paul Elmer More. Pp. 201. Princeton University Press. Humphrey Milford. 9s.

The pith of this book seems to us to be given in the following passage: "I must abide forever in a state of mental docility, with my lesson never fully learned. In such a world the sceptic and the Platonist and the Christian are equally at ease, but the rationalist is an outcast; and against such a state of pupilage the intellect rebels with the pride of a Satan" (p. 99). We think that Dr. More would say that he is here giving the lesson of the pilgrimage which has led him at last to Catholic Christianity. He addresses himself in this book chiefly to those outside the Church; but many within it will be grateful to him for the light which he throws on the meaning of their own faith.

First, then, What is a sceptic? He is "one who perceives clearly a distinction between fact and theory, and, in the language of old Socrates, has planted himself firmly on the foundation of all wisdom—the knowing when he knows and when he does not know" (p. 170). As immediately given we have the data of *observation*, our perceptions of the physical world, and of *intuition*, our sense of right and wrong. On the basis of "observation," a long line of rationalist philosophers have constructed deterministic and monistic systems; but these, as Socrates perceived, can never explain the fact that he (as we see him in the *Phædo*) is sitting in prison instead of conveying himself away to Megara or some other place of safety; *this* could only be explained if we could understand the meaning of the Good (pp. 36-8). Socrates and Plato, being good sceptics, never say that they know when they do not; and Plato continues the search through four closely related treatments of the subject—in the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Laws*—finding his way first to the affirmation of the reality of Good in the doctrine of Ideas, and finally to a teleological theism. The data of "intuition" lead him ultimately to the inference that there is a purpose in the world controlled by a transcendent God (pp. 39-71).

"Man," says Dr. More, "is intellectually impotent and morally responsible" (p. 89). But Plato's teleological faith was like "a strategic hill captured by the spirit in the great battle of truth, and then overswept by the hostile forces fighting under the banner of so-called Reason" (p. 98). Rationalistic philosophy yields to the seductive temptation to believe that man is intellectually competent at the cost of making shipwreck of his moral responsibility. On the other side stand the religions of the world, whose quest, like Plato's, has been the quest for a genuine teleology. But in every case except one, religion has

ended, after promising beginnings, in failure and futility; and even Israel, after the magnificent teleological affirmations of the prophets, was on the point of a similar failure when Jesus came. The teleology alike of Plato and of the Old Testament find their fulfilment in the Incarnation of the Word.

In his last chapter Dr. More returns to his starting-point. What is the sceptic to do? Shall he, seeing that the determinism of the philosophers is but an inference from the data of observation, and that the teleology of Plato and of Christianity is an inference from the data of intuition, adopt the agnostic attitude, and say that he cannot know what the truth is? But he has got to live somehow, well or ill; and if he takes the agnostic attitude, he is giving the same negative answer as the determinist to the problem of moral responsibility. The fulfilment of the quest of the true sceptic is found when he enters the Church, as the port from which to set sail on the great adventure. “‘In the world ye shall have tribulation; but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world.’ These, I take it, are the sailing-orders of the sceptic” (p. 194).

Those who delight in heresy-hunting will have opportunity to pass criticisms, if they wish, on Dr. More’s treatment of the nature of evil on p. 75 *ff.* Certainly the faith of the Bible and of the Church is that the earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof; and Dr. More seems to fall short of this when he finds the root of evil in a hidden *ἀνγάκη*, a contrariety in things which remains eternally resistant to the teleological action of God. Christianity finds the contrariety in the opposition of created wills to God’s Will—*i.e.*, in Original Sin. But on pp. 163-4 we find him refusing to commit himself: “Everything about me, the very meaning of the word ‘purpose’ as drawn from intuition of my own nature, tells me that there is something in the sum of existence besides the will of God, and beyond that patent fact I deem it folly to conjecture.”

This attitude is the very opposite of that of a heretic; and Dr. More’s whole attitude and method of approach seems to us deeply orthodox. We find him writing a sentence such as this: “So far as our limited intelligence may be permitted to play on the theme [of the Divine Logos], the unfolding of the Divine purpose of self-revelation would seem to be in some such manner as this” (p. 159). His thesis that man is intellectually impotent and morally responsible reflects the intellectual humility proper to a Christian. It is not a denial of the validity of reason, but only of its universal competence, of its ability to reproduce the map of the universe that exists in the mind of the Creator. And there is a warning for theologians, not only for thorough-going systematizers like John Calvin, but also for those who call

themselves Liberal Catholics, in a passage on p. 17—a passage which bears the traces of the Platonic notion of a non-infinite God, but which yet has its lesson: "If ever theologians, whether Christian or non-Christian, growing restive under the restraints of anthropomorphism, have framed what seemed to them a higher definition of the Supreme Being, if ever they have declared His freedom to be absolute power to do as He would, if they have altered responsibility into absolute authority over good and evil as though moral distinctions were no more than the decrees of His unconditioned will, if they have transmuted purpose into absolute creativeness—then they have done so, not by pursuing the humble inferences of faith from intuition, but by transferring to God the monistic inferences of absolute causality drawn from observation of the mechanical sequences of nature."

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. Illustrated from writers of the Period. By J. M. Creed, D.D., and J. S. Boys-Smith, M.A. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

In *Essays and Reviews*, Mark Pattison judiciously summed up the religious *ethos* of Great Britain in the early years of the eighteenth century. "The title of Locke's treatise, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*," he wrote, "may be said to have been the solitary thesis of Christian theology in England for the great part of a century. . . . Dogmatic theology had ceased to exist. The exhibition of religious truth for practical purposes was confined to a few obscure writers. Every one who had anything to say on sacred subjects drilled it into an array of argument against a supposed objector. Christianity appeared made for nothing else but to be 'proved'; what use to make of it when proved was not thought much about. Reason was at first offered as the basis of faith, but gradually became its substitute. . . . The defect of the eighteenth century theology was not in having too much good sense, but in having nothing besides" (ed. 1861, pp. 258, 259 f., 297).

The justice of this verdict is excellently illustrated by the catena of extracts which Dr. Creed and Mr. Boys-Smith have recently published. Forty-eight passages, the great majority of them from English writers, have been selected and arranged under the six headings: "Natural Religion and Revelation," "The Credentials of Revelation," "The Grounds and Sufficiency of Natural Religion Considered," "The Passing of the Age of Reason," "The Study of the Bible," and "The Church in its Relation to the State." The first four of these titles are them-

selves significant, for they indicate clearly enough where the main interests of eighteenth-century divinity lay. A study of the names of the selected divines is also instructive. While the editors had an abundant supply of material upon which to draw for the earlier half of the century, they were apparently unable to discover but little of use for the period after 1750. Accordingly for the later part of their epoch they have made extensive use of foreign writers—*e.g.*, Rousseau, Lessing, and Kant.

The inclusion of these passages from Continental writers, however incongruous it may appear in the abstract—for the treatise, in spite of its title, is clearly concerned chiefly with British thought—has its interest. The reader cannot but observe that the ideas and theology expressed in them fully harmonize with those of the extracts from our native divines. This is to be explained by the fact that there was very little characteristically “Anglican” theology in the eighteenth century. To realize this, one needs only to compare the writings upon which Dr. Creed and Mr. Boys-Smith have drawn with those written by representative divines of the preceding century. The days of Andrewes and Jackson and Laud and Cosin and Bramhall and Thorndike and Pearson were past. Divinity had ceased to be the study of the principles of the Anglican faith and life, and become instead a method of rather commonplace apologetic.

The root cause of the change must be sought in the events, political and religious, of the later years of the seventeenth century. These events were to have a disastrous influence upon Anglican thought. The massive and comprehensive structural unity of Caroline divinity, wherein the traditional, the philosophical, the mystical, the ethical, and the sacramental elements in religion were synthesized into an organic whole, was shattered. With the rupture of the Church in 1690 into “Jurors” and “Non-Jurors” came a corresponding bifurcation in religious ideals. Whereas the specifically “intellectual” elements in religion were henceforward cultivated all but exclusively by the “Jurors” and their successors, the “mystical” and the “sacramental” elements became the peculiar possession of the “Non-Jurors” and their disciples. The unfortunate effects occasioned by this mutual isolation were felt by both sides not only throughout the eighteenth century, but also through the greater part of that which followed. In its earlier stages the Anglo-Catholic Movement was concerned almost solely with the traditional, mystical, and sacramental side of religion, to the neglect of its broader philosophical aspects, whereas the first phase of the Liberal Movement, while it

courageously faced up to the intellectual problems demanding attention through the discoveries in Natural Science and Biblical Criticism and elsewhere, often shewed but little understanding of the sacramental view of religion, which it not infrequently deeply suspected. It is only comparatively recently that the theological division of 1690 has been healed. The revived belief in the possibility of an Anglican theology which can find room for the manifold elements of religious experience and life, and yet be in immediate contact with the highest "secular" thought, is an achievement of the last half-century. One needs only to consider the body of theological literature which has been brought into being by those whose names are to be found among the contributors to such collections of essays as *Lux Mundi*, *Foundations*, and *Essays Catholic and Critical*, to perceive how far we have moved from the standpoints both of the eighteenth and of the early nineteenth centuries. It may be justly said that "anyone who comes fresh from reading the Caroline divines to Gore and the other essayists of *Lux Mundi* will feel that here . . . he has picked up again the straight continuity of direction" (P. E. More, in a forthcoming essay which the present writer is enabled to quote).

The editors, and also the printers, deserve the highest praise for the careful and attractive way in which the volume before us has been produced. The essay of some thirty pages with which the documents are introduced is a masterly piece of accurate writing, restrained in the expression of opinions and studiously balanced in its judgments. The biographical notes prefixed to the extracts reflect the same careful and accurate scholarship. For our own part we should have preferred to have seen the spelling and capitalization modernized in the text of the extracts; for in passages of the length here reprinted, the contemporary usage is apt to distract the reader who has not a sufficiently long extract before him to become acquainted with the vagaries of each writer. The result is a suggestion of archaism which, when the reader's attention is directed solely to the context of a passage, is often not to be found.

F. L. CROSS.

DEVOTION AND DISCIPLESHIP. By A. H. McNeile, D.D.
Heffer and S.P.C.K. 6s.

This is a reprint in "omnibus" form of Dr. McNeile's "little blue books," and will be welcomed by many. Dr. McNeile was a man of deep and real piety as well as a scholar, and his teaching in this volume bears on its face the mark of personal

experience, and contains much that will be of value to those who desire practical guidance in meditation clearly and simply expressed. Nevertheless his teaching, especially in his first book, *Self-Training in Prayer*, is open to criticism on important points.

The aim of prayer is defined by Dr. McNeile thus: "The goal itself, the inner essence of Prayer, is one and the same. It is by a deliberate act of our whole being to make real to ourselves the divine Reality" (p. 15). Prayer is indeed "a deliberate act of our whole being," but in the latter part of his definition our author parts company with all reputable spiritual writers and, by making self the end of prayer, puts the cart before the horse. Prayer is not a self-regarding action, but a God-regarding one, of which God Himself is the sole object. In the classical definition of St. John of Damascus, it is "the lifting up of the mind to God." The primary aim of prayer is adoration, but of this Dr. McNeile has little to say—he is far more concerned with experience, which is a secondary matter. Self and personal effort are central to his thought (the titles of two parts of this volume, *Self-Training in Prayer*, *Self-Training in Meditation*, shew this clearly), and he stresses the human act of prayer so strongly that the action of grace is virtually discounted. Speaking of salvation (and his theology of prayer runs on similar lines), he writes: "What Christ does and what Christ is can do nothing for us apart from what we do and what we are. Most religious people today have fortunately ceased to sum up God's method of salvation in the words—Believe that Christ died for you, and He will do the rest. We rather say—Believe in Christ who died for you, throw yourself actively into His scheme of salvation, and He will procure forgiveness and power so that *you* may do the rest" (p. 281). The first sentence is, of course, quite true, but the rest of the quotation presents us with a false dilemma, for salvation is the work of divine grace freely responded to by the human will, which can in no wise "do the rest" by itself. And the same is true of prayer. We miss in these pages any adequate recognition of the work of grace in prayer.

As souls grow in the disciplined love of God, so their way of prayer changes, for this reason: what may be proper to one is by no means so to another. Dr. McNeile does not appear to recognize this cardinal fact. He plainly considers meditation as the normal prayer of all Christian souls—but some are unable to meditate, not because they fail in "self-training," but because God is leading them by another way. Similarly, contemplation is not, as our author conceives it to be, a way of prayer which can be practised by all as they will; no soul can

attain to it by any amount of "self-training," least of all beginners, whom Dr. McNeile chiefly has in mind. Contemplation is truly, according to the best authorities, open to all, but it is a gift of God granted usually to souls who are by no means beginners, but have advanced far in self-discipline (a very different thing from self-training) and the love of God. It cannot be practised at will like meditation or affective prayer. The phrase "beginners attempting the practice of contemplation" reveals a complete misapprehension of its nature. What the writer probably has in mind, though he expressly refers to true contemplation, is a simple form of affective prayer, a way of praying to which he never explicitly refers.

There are four strange phrases to which reference may be made.

1. "Self-training in prayer for anyone who wants to become an expert . . ." (p. 25). This is surely exalting a secondary aim into a primary one. One should desire to pray well not in order to become an expert in prayer but a lover of God.

2. "United contemplation" (p. 44). What is this?

3. "Nothing spoils the reality of our religion so much as unreality" (p. 201). This hardly requires comment.

4. "Whether you can pray more elaborately than other people, or less, does not matter in the least. Nothing matters if you only pray." An excellent piece of advice, but it should be noted that elaboration in prayer so far from being a virtue is quite the reverse; true progress in prayer is always towards simplicity.

Dr. McNeile's teaching on the devotional use of the Bible, coming as it does from one who was at once a man of prayer and a biblical scholar, is extremely good, and the devotional addresses which form the greater part of the volume are full of ideas which may be used as considerations in meditation. The little meditation on the lost piece of silver is a gem of its kind, and the reader must not be discouraged if his own efforts fail to produce anything comparable to it.

F. P. HARTON.

NOTICES

SACRED SITES AND WAYS. By Gustav Dalman, D.D. Authorized translation by Paul Levertoff. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

It is not every one who has that pilgrim type of mind which ascribes great importance to topography. Many are quite indifferent as to where an event took place; what concerns them is the event itself. To them it does not matter whether the multitudes were fed on the east or on the

west of the Sea of Galilee; it is enough that the bread was broken and that all were satisfied. Was Pilate's Prætorium in the Castle of Antonia or in Herod's palace? Why, some would ask, spend time and thought on such a question, since all that really concerns the devout spirit is the supreme trial scene; its exact locality has little bearing, if any, on the facts and their meaning.

Others, however, feel differently. To them it is a spiritual uplift to trace, even in imagination, the exact course which the Master followed in His journeys, to lay a finger on each resting-place, to identify the site of every miracle and the scene of every discourse. To such this book of Dr. Dalman's will be of the highest value. The author has necessarily constructed for himself a continuous history of the ministry of our Lord, constituting practically a harmony of the four Gospels. This done, he has followed every movement, discussed the locality of every event, and described in vivid detail its present appearance. It is hardly necessary to go to Palestine in order to form a fairly accurate mental picture of the chief sites in the Gospel story.

This, moreover, is no mere pilgrim's guide book, though it may well serve as a complete work of reference for the traveller who wishes to follow the steps of Jesus. It is the work of a great scholar—the greatest of living Palestinian scholars—and is rich in citations from Rabbinic and other ancient literature, especially that of the early Church. Frequently, too, we have the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus cited in Aramaic, though it is not always clear whether the dialect used is that of Palestine or of Edessa. Whilst Dr. Dalman is not a professional archæologist, he is familiar with the processes and the results of excavation. The interest of Palestinian archæology seems to have been concentrated of late on a much earlier period than that of Christ, and there is, therefore, little reference that can be made to the times of our Lord. Further, most of the New Testament sites are still occupied, and excavations are impossible. Capernaum is, fortunately, one of the few places that can be investigated thoroughly, and Dr. Dalman has made good use of the opportunities afforded for research there.

This, then, is a book packed with reliable information, adequately equipped with maps and plans, and well furnished with references to relevant literature, ancient and modern. It is a volume which is in itself interesting to read through, and, though it is not intended to be a complete geography of Palestine, it is of permanent value as a work of reference. It remains to add only that Dr. Levertoff's translation is a competent piece of work, and no casual reader would suspect that English was not the language in which the book was originally written.

T. H. ROBINSON.

WHEN DID OUR LORD ACTUALLY LIVE? By John Stewart, Ph.D.
T. and T. Clark. 4s. 6d.

This study attempts to shew that Christ's birth was in 8 B.C., His death in 24 A.D. Anything that encourages re-examination of a thorny problem is to be welcomed. But the discussion of the chronology of Tiberius, Herod, etc., will not be taken seriously by scholars when it comes from an author who uses such arguments as the following. Daniel ix. 26, with its reference to 7+62 weeks means that "the anointed one shall be cut off" 483 years after 459 B.C., i.e., in 24 A.D. And a Taoist work

written in China about 1701 teaches us that news of the Crucifixion, Resurrection and Ascension reached China in 25-28 A.D., which is confirmed by St. Paul's statement in Rom. x. 18 that their words have reached the ends of the world.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE GATE OF LIFE. By Dr. W. R. Inge. Longmans. 2s. 6d.

Dr. Inge must be tired of being told that he is "one of the acutest brains in Europe." But whatever his qualities are, whatever he writes finds eager readers. He says what he thinks and, whether his conclusions are acceptable or not, it is impossible not to admire and be thankful for the courageous way he refuses to shut his eyes to ugly facts. In this volume we have some of his later sermons, which some of us heard in Cambridge, and we are glad to read them again. He has a way of putting his finger on a tender spot and upsetting any complacency we may be nurturing. Perhaps the most inspiring and helpful of the sermons is the one entitled "Death the Gate of Life." In "An Uncharted Journey" he seems to look forward to a time when the individual will need no exterior authority to guide him, every man's experience being his own credentials and justification. This means the end of institutional religion. This somehow does not coincide with the fact of man's social instincts. Even by such forecasts as these Dr. Inge forces his reader to think.

W. E. LUTYENS.

A NEW HIGHWAY TOWARDS CHRISTIAN REALITY. By I. Wigley. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

The writer takes for his text a passage from Mr. Julian Huxley's *Religion without Revelation*, which affirms that the organized Churches "have lost all claim to the intellectual values," seeing that they hold "a creed which is intellectually outworn." This judgment is supported in the last chapter by Professor Leuba's conclusion, after examination of a thousand American students, that "Christianity, as a system, has utterly broken down, and nothing definite, adequate, and convincing has taken its place." It is for such cause that Mr. Wigley has set himself to construct *A New Highway*.

The writer, who is a Congregational minister, has read widely, and gives many citations in full from modern scientists, philosophers and men of letters; citations, indeed, must occupy quite half the book. Of Anglican writers he makes fullest use of Bishop Barnes, Dr. Major, and Dean Rashdall, and he is heartily on the side of the Modernists. And his Modernism carries him far, for he finds no place in his new construction for belief in the Incarnation, or in the Holy Trinity, or in miracle, while the Atonement is interpreted in the terms of Dean Rashdall's Bampton Lectures. For him the essence of Christianity is "that it is part of that increasing revelation of an immanent God in vital relation, always and at all times, with the spirit of man, finding perfect expression in Jesus Christ." For Jesus he has profound reverence. In him "we see one who supremely embodied the divine in human terms, a new emergent, complete in self-mastery, because of the perfect harmony attained. In the light of what he was we see what man may be, are ashamed of what we are, and in our very shame are conscious that where he leads we too must follow." But this reverence does not permit of worship; Jesus

was indeed divine-man, but so are all men, only he was far above all other men. Readers will note that while there is presented a worthy conception of God as Father, and as Love, and a high ideal for moral endeavour, there is no mention of any ways of holding intercourse with God, nor of any divine helps to walking on this New Highway.

Anglicans will agree with the writer's demand that theology must take cognisance of all new knowledge. The Bishops' Report on "The Christian Doctrine of God" at the 1930 Lambeth Conference runs: "This new scientific conception, great and illuminating as it is, reveals the unity of creation and a progressive order. We find in the order thus disclosed plain evidence of an age-long purpose which has culminated in the spiritual endowments of man. We hold, also, and we find our conviction shared by thinkers in many fields, that a truly creative process must be assumed, that this has been throughout continuous, and that it has involved emergence of new qualities of being. We regard this creative process as not only spiritual in its results, but also spiritual in its origin."

The Bishops, however, proceed to re-assert plainly the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos, the Resurrection of Christ from the dead, the operation of the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine of the Trinity. God, they declare, is not only immanent, "He is also transcendent, in that the whole creation has its source in Him." He is a God who answers prayer. "Holding that the laws of nature are His laws, we hold that He is supreme in the universe, and that there is no limit to the Divine Power in the answering of prayer."

Mr. Wigley may observe that the Chairman of the Committee was Archbishop D'Arcy, and that Bishop Barnes was a member of it, both of whom he quotes respectfully.

As to miracle, *The New Highway* appeals (p. 141) to Dr. Major, who decides that "God does not reveal Himself (as a pre-scientific and pre-critical age supposed) in miracles which are *contra naturam*. . . . The modernist does believe in the supernatural, but it is a non-miraculous supernatural, not the miraculous supernatural of many traditionalists. The modernist is no 'irruptionist.' He believes that God enters into human life, but not that He enters it in a cataclysmic fashion." Long ago St. Augustine explained miracle as not *contra naturam*, but as *contra notam naturam*. Surely geology and history alike have given ample proof that God can, and does, enter into both nature and human life in a cataclysmic fashion.

A feature of this book is its display of unfeigned contempt for orthodox dogma and traditionalist Christianity.

Orthodox theologians seem to be those who "identify Christianity with primitive theologies"; "who build up their theologies only on New Testament data, or on the sayings of the Church Fathers, with their backs turned to the new knowledge"; who make "well-meaning, but doomed, attempts to harmonize the new knowledge with the old theological dogmas"; who "adopt the 'patter' of science for camouflage purposes, while actually holding fast to the old dogmas." "The choice before us is whether we shall be scientific in religion or superstitious." And so on, throughout the book.

In spite of these reproaches we have good reason for confidence that the old faith, truly taught, appeals to men in general, as any new Christianity does not, and never will. Our own youth is responding, and there is no lack of able young applicants for Holy Orders. Many American

youths, we believe, are not in a state of revolt against Christian dogma, but in a state of ignorance as to what Christianity is. This is due to the absence, deplored by leading Americans, of the Christian instruction in the public educational system, which absence has misled boys and girls to think that religious knowledge is unimportant as compared with science, mathematics, literature and business. And this defect in education is caused through the religious divisions of Christians. Hence the urgent summons to Reunion, which came forth from America, and resulted in the Lausanne Conference of 1927.

This Conference may serve as indication to modernists that the old dogmas are not dead or dying. Here assembled some four hundred leaders of "the organized Churches," representing practically all Christendom, with the serious exception of the Roman Catholic Church. And these Churches are the only effective agencies of Christianity amongst mankind. Many of these men were of high repute in the religious world. They agreed unanimously, in "The Church's message to the world," that "in the fulness of time the Eternal Word became incarnate, and was made man, Jesus Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, full of grace and truth." They also declared that "Notwithstanding the difference in doctrine among us, we are united in a common Christian Faith, which is proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures, and is witnessed to and safeguarded in the Ecumenical Creed, commonly called the Nicene, and in the Apostles' Creed, which Faith is continuously confirmed in the spiritual experience of the Church of Christ."

This book is well worth reading, as one more bold effort to "preach another Gospel." The author claims to write with freedom and sincerity. There is certainly freedom, and the sincerity and also the industry are unquestionable. Several chapters are useful, especially perhaps that on "Personal Survival," though "immanentism" forbids him to accept the Gospel records of the Resurrection, and the evidence which St. Paul "received" at his conversion, and maybe before it. But many new and broad Highways are being built in England today. They are called "By-pass Roads," because they do not lead into the city.

J. O. NASH, C.R., B.P.

THE GENERAL EPISTLES OF ST. PETER AND ST. JUDE. Edited by J. W. C. Wand, Archbishop of Brisbane. (Westminster Commentaries.) Methuen. 15s.

The First Epistle of St. Peter, with its simple expression of fundamental truths, its kindly pastoral spirit, and its evident affection for the Shepherd and Bishop of our souls, is one of the most attractive of the New Testament documents. The Archbishop of Brisbane has evidently felt this. He believes in his subject, and that in a modern commentary is a thing sufficiently rare to be refreshing. The reader of this commentary will not rise from it with that sterility of soul which is the common effect of much modern work. That is not to say that the treatment is uncritical: the opinions of other scholars receive full consideration, and Dr. Wand's conservative conclusions are the fruit of careful reasoning and not of mere prejudice.

"This gallant and high-hearted exhortation," Dr. Wand thinks, is an authentic writing of St. Peter, sent to the churches named in the subscription as an encouragement in the face of troubles present and im-

pending, and possibly also as a testimonial to Silvanus, whose faithfulness may have been impugned in the slight disorders which are thought to have disturbed the churches. Of this latter suggestion we may remark that the traces left by the disorders are so slight that they must have been very slight indeed. The comparison of the ethical rules for various classes of society as given in this epistle with those of the Pauline epistles suggests that it was written at a date early enough to fall within St. Peter's lifetime. Its doctrine is not the "diluted Paulinism" which some have supposed it to be, but is "central" Christianity such as was held everywhere independently of St. Paul's influence; indeed, the characteristic Pauline themes of the Old and the New Adam, of the Law and Grace, and so forth, find no place here. The persecution from which the recipients of the letter suffer is of a private and unofficial kind; it has not yet become a criminal offence to be a Christian, though a fiery trial is not far distant. The Epistle's affinities with other New Testament writings are considered at length, with the conclusion that I. Peter is earlier than some of them, and not so dependent on others as to be of much later date. These indications of an early date leave it possible for us to accept the testimony of the superscription and the very strong external evidence that St. Peter is the author.

With regard to II. Peter and Jude, Dr. Wand takes the now commonly accepted view that the former is pseudonymous and is later than Jude. It would at present require great temerity to question this view, though it is well to observe that both epistles suggest thoughts that are by no means to be rejected because they cannot be proved to be of apostolic authorship. The idea of Christians becoming "partakers of the divine nature" deserves more attention than it commonly receives, and it is possible that forms of Christianity which have relinquished the hope of Our Lord's Coming have stripped themselves of their sanctions.

Dr. Wand's notes on the text, with his longer notes on important themes, supply complete materials for interpretation. Many readers will think that he has done more than justice to opinions with which he disagrees. His usual method is to give his own judgment last, and as that is often the only one worth consideration, probably the commentary could have been made much shorter without material loss. I. Peter has four important references to the Atonement (i. 2, i. 18, ii. 24, and iii. 18), on which Dr. Wand rightly remarks that we have here no theory of the Atonement, though we have the materials on which a theory could be based. It would be equally true to remark that we have the fact of Atonement through Christ as a permanent background of the thoughts of both the writer of the epistle and its recipients: it is referred to the foreknowledge (which involves the purpose) of God: it is connected with the sacrificial system of the Old Testament, and with the vicarious suffering of God's righteous Servant: and it is linked with its evangelic basis in our Lord's statement that He came to give His life as a ransom for many. This, too, is "central" or basic Christianity, in which there is complete agreement between Paul and Peter and everyone else who in apostolic days called himself a Christian.

On page 17, line 7, read *concert* for *consort*: and in the note on I. Peter ii. 8, read *disobedient* for *disobedience*.

E. EVANS.

RELIGION AND THE SCIENCES OF LIFE. By William McDougall. Methuen. 8s. 6d.

The essays here reprinted have nearly all appeared in periodicals. The famous writer is a psychologist whose two great interests outside his professional studies are psychical research and eugenics. Both of these subjects are here discussed with characteristic vigour and precision. A "eugenic" paper on "Japan or America" (written in 1927) illustrates the difficulty of forecasting the future and even of diagnosing the present truly. "America alone [we read] enjoys a superabundance of material prosperity." "The Japanese people has recognised the fact . . . that her future pre-eminence must consist in breeding on a foundation of a stabilised restricted population. . . ." Several essays remark on the danger of birth-control, which threatens to wipe out the best stocks: one essay remarks on the rapidly increasing population of the world. The title "Our Neglect of Psychology" reads curiously when we remember that Psychology is almost the spoiled child among modern studies. The whole book is one to be read with much pleasure and profit, remembering that a learned author is not necessarily better informed than you or I outside his special field of knowledge.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

CREEDS IN THE MAKING. By the Rev. Alan Richardson. S.C.M. Press. 2s. 6d.

In spite of a few mistakes this is a good little book, packed full of information, but the author would do well to read the works of Clement Webb, especially his *God and Personality*. As it is, he does not seem to have made up his mind whether we ought to speak of one or of three "personalities" in God. The word "person," as he points out, is ambiguous. It cannot be applied to God in precisely the same meaning as we use it of men, but an ambiguous term, unless the senses of it are carefully distinguished, does not conduce to clearness of thought. This is a particular point, but there is also one characteristic which runs all through the book and partly diminishes its value. In a certain sense the appeal in each generation must necessarily be made to the "modern mind"; our Lord Himself, though conscious of their inadequacy, used the categories of His own time; but the "modern mind" must not be erected into a sort of court of final appeal. The author is well aware of this limitation in relation to past ages; he discards, for instance, one after another the various theories that have been held concerning the Atonement. But he does not seem to be aware that each of these was an appeal to the "modern mind" of its own time or, if he is so aware, he does not draw the obvious inference that the "modern mind" of today is likely to be similarly biased. With much the same intention he appeals to "experience" as the ultimate ground of Christian conviction. But experience is necessarily the experience of some person or body of persons, and our author nowhere states whose experience it is to which he appeals. We should gather that it is the experience of the "modern mind" to which he refers. But on two counts this is unsatisfactory. We dwell in a mixed world, or a world of mixed experiences; while some of our experiences would tend to confirm the Christian faith, others of them would seem to run directly counter to it. The point is well made by R. A. Knox in his witty criticism of *Foundations*,

entitled *Some Loose Stones*, and is named by him "the hypothesis of the Cacodæmon." The Christian, of course, would say that some of his experiences are, in the providence of God, meant to exemplify the truth of the belief which he holds, while others spring ultimately from the devil or devils, sin, or maladjustment or whatever language the modern mind would prefer to use, and are a temptation allowed by God to test his constancy. But by discriminating between his experiences he implies the existence of some canon or standard of truth by which those experiences are to be judged. And this proves to be the Christian faith. It is obvious, therefore, that individual experience cannot furnish a sufficient ground for the faith by which that very experience is judged. The appeal to experience, then, is not simply an appeal to the experience of the individual. The individual cannot claim to be the final expert. He needs an experience wider and more penetrating than his own to correct his personal bias, otherwise he is falling down and worshipping what Bacon would call "the idols of the cave." Here, therefore, comes in the authority of Scripture and of the Church as that of a court of experts, and it is the agreement of these that makes the threefold cord that is not quickly broken. But this agreement or consistency must be tested by reason, for statements which contradict each other or themselves cannot be true together. And in the final resort Christian experience is not so much the possession of the individual Christian or prophet or society as of the Christ who indwells them, directs and possesses them. Each is but the stammering utterance of a voice which sounds in the accents of authority, "But I say unto you." It is this note of authority that we miss. But all religions have claimed to be, and all religion must be, authoritative, as resting on a divine revelation. Christ is reported to have said, "Go into all the world and teach," and there is such a thing as obedience to the faith; and it is the modern mind in all ages that needs not only to be edified, but to be converted from the limitations and prejudices of its modernity to what has manifested by its identity of substance however disguised by changing forms its permanence and inalterability.

F. J. BADCOCK.

FAITH THAT ILLUMINATES. Edited by V. A. Demant. The Centenary Press. 3s. 6d.

We envy the parish of St. John-the-Divine, Richmond, where the lectures which are collected in this book were originally delivered; though our envy is mitigated now they are offered to a wider public.

The thread of argument which runs through these lectures is that Catholic Tradition is the guardian and not the opponent of reason and liberty in man's political, economic and social relations. Mankind has for long turned its back on the spiritual values in experience, and this so far from bringing liberty has led us into the bog of boredom, confusion and chaos.

Mr. Demant contributes a useful introduction. Then Mr. T. S. Eliot writes on Religion and Literature, and insists on the duty of Christians maintaining standards different from those applied by the rest of the world. Not that he in any way approves of censorship, but he points out that most of our modern literature is written by people "ignorant of the fact that there are still people in the world so 'backward' or so 'eccentric' as to continue to believe" in the Catholic Faith.

Mr. Widdrington, in his illuminating discussion on "Leisure," arouses us to see the dangers and difficulties for religion of the new Leisure Age, but sees before us an opportunity for interpreting Christianity in a far richer and finer way than ever before. He calls us to restore the broken rhythm of life in work, leisure and worship, reminding us that "the average working week of the labouring population was, as late as 1770, four days a week." He holds that in the true doctrine of Contemplation and Worship (practised not in isolation, but in the perfect society of the Church) lies the hope for the world of using and disciplining our new opportunities of leisure.

Mr. Reckitt gives us a stimulating essay on the old question of the relation of Church and State and reminds us of the tension that is bound to be produced by the Christian's living in both "worlds"—a tension that has lately become more acute. He deals some hard knocks at Toleration which is "bred, not by Freedom out of Courtesy, but by Deadlock out of Exhaustion," and pleads for a virile and active liberty if we are to escape from the perils of the Totalitarian State.

The other essays on "Religion and Economics," by Mr. Peck, "Religion and Philosophy," by Lord Justice Slesser, and "Religion and Morality," by Mr. Ellis Roberts, are also full of good things.

It is a pity there are a few unimportant misprints, but you cannot expect everything for 3s. 6d.

GEOFFREY KEABLE.

THE GLORY OF THE FATHER. By H. Leonard Pass. Mowbray. 8s. 6d.

This is a devotional and theological study in St. John xiii.-xvii. Canon Pass writes for the general reader, while at the same time the ordinary Biblical student will find plenty of helpful suggestions. He accepts these chapters as on the whole an authentic account of the actual words of Our Lord.

He begins with an interesting comparison between the last words of Socrates as reported in the *Phædo*. The author divides these chapters into three parts, XIII.-XIV., XV.-XVI., and XVII., prefacing each part with a valuable, if literal, translation of his own. He also arranges it in dialogue form; this is, in places, illuminating.

There are also three useful appendices, one of which discusses the order of the text. The book is, we confess, rather heavy, and is not likely to supersede Dr. H. B. Swete's *Last Discourse and Prayer of Our Lord*, to which the author acknowledges his indebtedness.

GEOFFREY KEABLE.

ABAILARD'S ETHICS. Translated with an Introduction by the Rev. J. Ramsay McCallum, M.A. Blackwell. 6s.

This is the first attempt to render into English a short ethical treatise, called *Ethica seu Scito Teipsum*, by Abelard. It consists of one complete book in twenty-six chapters and a mere fragment of a second book. Abelard is always of importance as he stands at the very beginning of the Scholastic Movement when the form which it subsequently took was not yet fixed and his personal contributions were vital to the later system. Thus, in this short book he does much to clarify the doctrine of "intention" which was afterwards to characterize so much of St. Thomas's ethical teaching. We find here many of the well-known features of

Abelard's genius, his originality, his daring criticism and also his brilliance and arrogance, the pelagianizing tendency of his thought as contrasted with the deeper insight of St. Augustine. It is evident also that at the time this treatise was composed the doctrine of the Sacraments was not by any means so rigidly thought-out as it afterwards became. He holds, for instance, that the "Power of the Keys" was given to the Apostles only and not transmitted to the Bishops, their successors. Distinctions between absolution and direction, and regulations for securing the inviolability of the seal of confession are not yet at all clearly worked out. It is a little difficult, perhaps, to justify the translator's claim that Abelard's doctrine of intention is "the ethical ground of protestantism," seeing that, when once thought out, it became one of the distinguishing marks of Catholic moral theory.

The translation reads easily and seems to be generally accurate, but on p. 42 it would appear that the real meaning of the doctrine quoted from St. Augustine—viz. that every *esse* is a *bonum*—has not been grasped.

W. R. V. BRADE.

MAN AND GOD. An Essay in the Psychology and Philosophy of Religious Experience. By Lindsay Dewar, Canon and Chancellor of York. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

This volume is an enlargement upon the themes of two courses of lectures delivered by Canon Dewar, one in the Berkeley Divinity School, Yale, and the other in the University of Leeds. There is nothing here of the scrappiness or desultoriness which often mark the attempt to turn lecture courses into books. This is a well-knit and wisely balanced argument, of which the purpose is to defend the validity of religious experience and to shew that it must always be the primary stuff of religious conviction.

The announcement of this object may lead the reader to suspect signs of a fall into the subjectivism which has so greatly cursed modern religion. The book will quickly dispel such a fear. The author accepts the scholastic view that logical thought cannot directly know God; but he refuses to allow the conclusion of a divine transcendence so remote as to be inapprehensible apart from special acts of revelation. He develops a doctrine of intuition, which he conceives as native to human personality, and by which, he holds, we may become empirically aware of God. This conception involves a considerable discussion of modern psychological theory, in which it becomes evident that the author is a genuine realist, and that "intuition" for him is no mere subjective state leading nowhere, but a true apprehension of objective reality. He consequently criticizes the scholastic neglect of the empirical argument, because he rightly sees that it would have been harmonious with the scholastic realism. But Thomism, aware that sense-perception could give no direct affirmation of God, and convinced of the limits of ratiocinative thought, lacked a sufficient conception of "intuition" to enable it to accept the possibility of an empirical apprehension of God.

It is as a means of discovering reality beyond things visible that Canon Dewar regards "intuition." He has no sympathy with the self-centrality which has followed from Schleiermacher. Nor on the other hand will he give any approval to the Barthian attempt to restore objectivity and transcendence to Protestant theology in Germany. For he

holds that Barth and Brunner, by maintaining that faith is independent of experience, and entirely God's act, have set up only an intolerable dualism.

We are thus presented with a conception of experimental religion which is capable of being held in organic relation with the ontal and axiological arguments. Canon Dewar, by relating the intuitive method with the apologetics derived from the concepts of "being" and "value," immensely strengthens his case and avoids many ancient pitfalls. Moreover, whereas emphasis upon "experience" in religion has frequently led to dissidence, and to the denial of the Church's authority as necessary, the chapter on the Interpretation of Religious Experience brings powerful arguments to shew that the empirical apprehension of God requires the authority of the Church, not merely for its vindication, but in order that it may reach its surest and most fruitful results. The book contains some delightful sallies against certain moderns. It is a fine and competent piece of work, most readably written.

W. G. PECK.

FOOTNOTES TO ST. PAUL. By C. A. Anderson Scott. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

It is pleasant to find a specialist of the eminence of the author writing a popular book on some of the leading conceptions of St. Paul, and these conceptions are set down with pith and point. Dr. Anderson Scott concerns himself with the teaching contained in the Epistles. He omits the consideration of the Pastoral Epistles on the ground of want of space, but mainly, we think, on the ground that those portions of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus which can with any confidence be ascribed to the Apostle to the Gentiles add little or nothing to our knowledge of his teaching. The footnotes on such matters as the anger of God and faith-union with Christ on the one hand, and those on the courtesy and the sensitiveness of St. Paul on the other, are admirable. Our only regret is that the book is so short. Throughout this book the author takes pains to remove the idea that St. Paul knew little and cared less about the Jesus of history, or that he saw the death of Jesus as a sacrifice. We gravely wonder why St. Paul did not quote from some of the sources of the Gospel narrative, with which he was probably familiar, in the course of his controversy with the Apostles on the occasion of the Jerusalem visit. It seems such an obvious method of getting rid of this opposition. We should entirely dissent from the author's position that no man ever understood our Lord, His teaching, His personality, and His value for mankind, as St. Paul. That pre-eminent position we should certainly assign to St. John.

R. H. MURRAY.

BOOK NOTE

The Drama of the Eucharist. By Stacy Waddy, M.A., D.D. S.P.G. and S.P.C.K. Paper, 1s.; cloth, 2s. 6d. If books are to be recommended for Lent reading, why not for Easter? Here is a rather unusual little book of disquisitions and meditation headings designed to stimulate "worship-visions" and based on the not unchallengeable assumption that the Revelation of St. John is the Church's first worship-book for its Eucharistic worship. It might fitly be tried out as an Easter-tide companion.